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The present study attempted to assess the effects of reattri­
bution of arousal in the natural settings of three dental offices. 
Adult dental patients received an injection of a local anesthetic 
during regular treatment and were assigned to one of three verbal 
information conditions: 1) Drug-informed 2) Normality or 3) 
Control. The subjects of the Drug-informed condition were 
informed that the injection typically produces physiological 
arousal symptoms. The Normality patients were informed as to the 
typical symptoms felt in the dental situation with no causal 
factor named. Control groups received no experimental information 
Patients' subsequent self-reports of level of arousal and causal 
attributions for the arousal were examined. Results revealed that 
as predicted, Drug-informed subjects reattributed part of their 
arousal to the drug and reduced their attributions of arousal to 
fear. Normality subjects did not reattribute their arousal but 
did reduce the perceived arousal level. Both experimental manip­
ulations were discussed as useful innovations for current dental 
practices. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The general orientation of attribution theory is to recognize 
rules by which an individual attempts to infer causes of the behavior 
which he/she observes. Attribution theory originated from the study of 
person perception and developed out of a variety of convergent lines of 
inquiry in social psychology. A dominant influence on contemporary 
work in the area of person perception has been the writings of Fritz 
Heider (1958). As a Gestalt psychologist, Heider made a major theore­
tical contribution toward our understanding of the principles of social 
perception upon introducing his "attribution theory"—a conceptualiza­
tion of how individuals understand and predict the behavior of other 
persons. 
According to Heider, we achieve understanding of others by 
tracing their actions to the relatively stable underlying attributes of 
the person and the environment in which they operate. Causation for 
behavior may thus be attributed to either situational or dispositional 
factors or a combination of these two components. 
Two major extensions of Heider's attribution theory were pro­
vided by the work of Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967, 1971). 
Both extensions attempted to construct a systematic framework of attri­
bution concepts. According to Kelley, a function of the attributional 
process is to create a sense of control in the perceiver. Thus, attri­
1 
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bution can be seen as an attempt to gain effective management of self and 
environment. Support for Kelley's concept of control is provided by re­
sults of studies which show that individuals attribute causality to them­
selves under conditions of success, while attributing causality to exter­
nal factors under conditions of failure (Miller, 1976; Sicoly & Ross, 
1977; Struefert & Struefert, 1969). Similarly, Cialdini, Braver, and 
Lewis (1974), in their work regarding interpersonal interaction, also 
noted that inferences which individuals made about the characteristics of 
others enhanced their own sense of competence and control. 
Kelley also proposed a principle of covariance, which when ap­
plied to three specific factors, can suggest whether an attribution for 
a behavior should be made to a dispositional or situational factor. 
These three factors considered are the distinctiveness and consistency 
of a behavior, and a consensus from other persons regarding its occur­
rence. 
The approach to attributional processes taken by Jones and Davis 
emphasized a concept of "correspondent inference." This theory, like 
Kelley's, regarded the basis of the attributional process to be that of 
understanding covariance, although the concentration here was on the ef­
fects of behavior. Jones and Davis specified the determinants of attri­
bution as the number of non-common effects and the assumed desirability 
of effects. These principles have also been supported by research 
(Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961). 
The systematic theorizing of these individuals produced an enor­
mous amount of interest and subsequent empirical studies, to the point 
where attribution is now one of the more heavily researched areas in 
3 
social psychology. Numerous spin-offs of the main theory have developed 
and have been applied in psychological areas. Those most relevant to 
this present pursuit are discussed in the following pages. 
Self-Perception Theory 
As it evolved through the work of Heider, Jones and Davis, and 
Kelley, attribution theory dealt primarily with the individual's percep­
tions and inferences regarding the causes of other persons' behaviors. 
The theoretical basis of understanding our own behavior as individuals 
was provided, in large part, by Daryl Bern's "Self-perception theory" 
(1965, 1967, 1972). The common qround between the process of self-
attribution and the former theories of attribution to others is easily 
recognized through Bern's writines. A differentiation between the self-
percention concept and orevious theories must be noted, however, as a 
significant aspect of the theory. Bern introduced his theory as an alter­
native interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomenon, and as such 
argued against a motivational interpretation of man's behavior, sub­
stituting an information-processing construct of self-attribution. 
Bern postulated that we infer the causes of our own behavior in 
much the same way as we would speculate about the behavior of others. 
That is, we look at observable behavior and reflect back to the oossible 
reasons for its occurrence. He then attribute beliefs, attitudes, and 
even internal states to ourselves by infering them from this observation 
of our own overt behavior and/or the circumstances in which it occurs. 
In this process we produce explanations for our behavior which may or 
may not be appropriate, but nevertheless are influencial in deter­
4 
mining our subsequent actions. 
Bern stated that often our own internal cues are strong and clear 
enough to make causal inferences about our behavior, but when informa­
tion from internal cues is weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the ind­
ividual must rely on external cues to infer internal states. This is 
functionally similar to being in the position of an outside observer. 
This process was well demonstrated in a study by Bandler, 
Madaras, and Bern (1968) in which subjects were required to receive a 
series of shocks to their hand, and could therefore observe themselves 
escaping or enduring the shock. Unknown to the subjects, all of the 
shocks were of the same intensity. Subjects' ratings of the shocks sup­
ported Bern's self-perception concept: Subjects rated the discomfort 
produced by the shocks to be greater in the "escape" condition (where 
subjects saw themselves escaping the shock by pulling their hand away) 
than in the "endurance" condition (where subjects saw themselves endur­
ing the shock). A record of the subjects' galvanic skin responses 
showed that actual physiological arousal was not serving as the basis 
for the differential discomfort ratings, so the authors had support for 
their conclusion that the observation of their own behavior v/as respon­
sible for the subjects' perceptions of pain. 
Bern's postulate that people partially infer their attitudes from 
the observation of their own behavior has been further supported in 
other areas of social research. Foot-in-the-door studies by Beaman, 
Svanum, Manlove, and Hampton (1974), Freedman and Fraser (1966) and 
Snyder and Cunningham (1975) along with a demonstration of helping be­
havior by Uranowitz (1975) illustrated self-perception principles. The 
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over-justification hypothesis oenerated by self-perception theory v/as 
tested by Lepper, Green, and Nisbett (1973a), through a field experiment 
performed with children. This hypothesis proposes that to the extent 
that an individual finds little external reason for his behavior, he 
will subsequently attribute that behavior to intrinsic motivation. The 
experimental hypothesis proposed that a person's intrinsic interest in 
an activity may be undermined by engaging him in the activity for a high 
external justification. Results of the study supported the predictions 
of the authors: Children who expected rewards for their participation 
in an activity showed less subsequent intrinsic interest in the same 
activity than did children who had not expected a reward. Bern's theory 
would explain these data by suggesting that the children in the no-
reward condition attributed their participation to an internal interest 
because they had no external justification as an alternative explanation. 
In a similar study, Lepper (1973b) decreased cheating behavior 
and maintained an attribution of honesty in children under conditions 
of low external justification. In an opposing condition, children qiven 
high external justification displayed more cheating behavior, suggesting 
less attributions of internal honesty on the latter group's part. 
Tv/o additional studies, Corah and Boffa (1970) and Klemp and 
Leventhal (1972), replicated and extended the Bandler, et al. publica­
tion (1968). Corah and Boffa illustrated how a cognitive factor (a 
sense of control) acts as an imnortant mediator in determining the 
degree to which pain is perceived by subjects. In their study perceived 
control of the painful stimuli promoted a perception of decreased pain. 
An additional point about the nature of the external cues in­
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volved in self-perception processes was made by Klemp and Leventhal, 
using the Bandler, et al. paradigm. Their experiment demonstrated that 
important individual differences exist in reactions to cognitive cues. 
More specifically, the predicted self-perception effects only occured 
with subjects who initially had displayed, and were therefore categorized 
as possessing, a high degree of tolerance for shock (and low fear). Low 
tolerance (high fear) subjects, however, did not demonstrate self-per-
ception effects; they rated "escape" shocks as less painful. The authors 
suggested that low tolerance subjects were highly fearful and therefore 
likely to be more responsive to the shock as a salient stimulus, since 
their mental set was to escape the shock as soon as possible. On the 
other hand, high tolerance subjects, being less concerned with the shock 
itself, could conceivably attend to their behavior as a salient factor, 
therein making them more likely to exhibit self-perception effects. 
The presence of a high versus low-anxiety differential was also 
noted by Rickels, Lipman, and Raab (1966) and discussed quite thoroughly 
by Brehm (1976, p. 162-4). In a study by Conger, Conger, and Brehm 
(1976), subjects in a snake-aversion relief experiment responded to the 
misattribution manipulation (false heart-rate feedback) only if they 
were initially relatively low in fear. Both increased approach behavior 
toward snakes and lessened emotional feelings as a result of reattribu­
tion were evidenced by these low-fear subjects. Brehm maintained that 
these findings regarding response differences between high and low-fear 
subjects are consistent with both Schachter's and Bern's basic postulates. 
A low-fear subject can be considered as being in a relatively ambiguous 
situation, feeling some arousal with no sharply-defined cause. An 
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external explanatory cue can easily therefore be accepted into the cogni­
tive framework. At the other extreme, a high-fear individual is not sub­
ject to such ambiguity, havinn labeled the internal arousal as fear. As 
such this person seeks no additional cues to account for the arousal, and 
the experimental manipulation is not likely to affect his judgment. In 
Bern's terms, he would not need to examine his behavior in order to know 
why the arousal is present. 
Cognition and Emotions 
Stanley Schachter's cognitive theory of emotions (1964) and the 
subsequent body of research related to this theory provide an empirically 
supported conceptualization of how we, as individuals, perceive our own 
emotional states. Schachter's theory represents one well-defined aspect 
of the general attribution theory, and also offers support for other 
attributional models such as self-perception. 
The basic principles of the cognitive theory of emotions were 
illustrated and supported in Schachter and Singer's classic 1962 exper­
iment. In this study, subjects were exposed to one of two emotion pro­
ducing situations. In the first, the "euphoria" condition, subjects 
waited in an experimental room in which a confederate feigned a euphoric 
state and encouraged the real subject to join in his fun. Prior to 
being placed in this emotion producina situation, one quarter of the 
subjects who were to take part were given an injection of epinephrine 
(adrenalin) and were told to expect autonomic arousal symptoms appro­
priate to the drug (epinephrine-informed group). Another quarter of the 
subjects received an injection of epinephrine, but were not informed as 
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to the effects it would produce (epinephrine-ignorant group), and one 
additional quarter of the subjects were similarly injected, but told to 
expect symptoms wholly unrelated to those which would occur (epinephrine-
misinformed group). The final one quarter of the subjects were simply 
injected with a saline solution and received no information about symp­
toms (placebo group). 
In the second condition, the "anger" condition, subjects were 
asked to fil l out an insulting questionnaire, while at the same time a 
participating experimental confederate expressed outrage at the ques­
tions. This anger condition included the same groupings and procedures 
as in the euphoria condition, with the exception that the epinephrine-
misinformed group was not included. 
The results of the study indicated that epinephrine-ignorant 
subjects in both the euphoric and anger conditions displayed signifi­
cantly greater emotion, appropriate to their condition, than did the 
epinephrine-informed groups. This significant difference was also 
maintained between the epinephrine-ignorant and the placebo groups in the 
anger condition. In the euphoria condition, where an epinephrine-misin­
formed group was included, the emotion displayed in this group was also 
significantly greater than the epinephrine-informed group. Interesting­
ly, the informed group was even less emotional than the placebo group, 
suggesting an over-compensation on their part for the effects of the 
drug. 
According to Schachter and Singer, their experiment illustrated 
how individuals search for reasons to understand their autonomic arousal, 
and they therefore suggested that emotions experienced are not simply a 
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function of the physiological arousal present, but also depend on the 
person's cognitions about the possible causes for his arousal. Cognitive 
processes mediate internal and external (environmental) cues, and the end 
product, an emotional state, is brought about by the interaction of both 
cognitive and physiological factors. 
In both of the experimental conditions above, internal cues were 
identical, as was the stimulus (the situation). However, subjects dif­
fered greatly in their evaluation of this stimulus, due to the cognitive 
factor involved in their particular condition. Informed-injected groups 
found an explanation for their arousal in the information they received 
about the drug, while the other injected groups, not finding an obvious 
reason for their arousal, responded to the situational cue. As evi­
denced by the informed-injected group, individuals may even fail to infer 
that they are being affected by a stimulus, if they are previously in­
formed that their physiological arousal is produced by an extrinsic fac­
tor. 
Schachter's central theoretical statement was that cognitive and 
physiological arousal factors interact to bring about the labeling of an 
emotional state. An internal arousal cue produces an evaluative need 
(to understand the feeling) which leads to a process of explanation in 
terms of external cues. The end result is the labeling of an emotional 
state. 
Even more so than just demonstrating Schachter's principles, 
this experiment suggested to researchers the logic of manipulating an 
individual's self-attributions regarding emotional states by maneuvering 
the external cues which are available to him. This idea has been put 
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into operation by numerous researchers, and the process of reattribution 
has been quite successfully demonstrated in various settings. 
Schachter's original (1962) study created a misattribution effect 
through manipulation of the apparent source of the subjects' arousal. In 
a follow-up study (1966), Nisbett and Schachter once again produced a re-
evaluation of stimuli through cognitively shifting the perceived cause of 
arousal. In this study no actual drug was used, in order to demonstrate 
how natural physiological reactions can influence subjective and behav­
ioral reactions to emotional stimuli. 
Prior to the experiment proper, all subjects were given a sugar 
pill (placebo). One half of the group was told that the pill would pro­
duce autonomic symptoms such as palpitations, increased breathing rate, 
and "butterflies", while the remaining one half was told to expect non-
arousal symptoms. All subjects then underwent a series of increasingly 
intense shocks, and were instructed to indicate the point at which the 
shocks became intolerable. Results confirmed the expectations of the 
authors. The group of subjects who were told to expect arousal symptoms 
reported less pain during the shock series, and tolerated nearly four 
times the shock amperage tolerated by other subjects. Analysis indica­
ted that the toleration of shock was a direct function of the extent to 
which subjects ascribed their arousal to the pill. It appeared that 
subjects lowered their evaluation of the intensity of the shock, which 
actually did produce the arousal, due to the cognition that the arousal 
was produced by the pill. In discussing their results, Nisbett and 
Schachter did note the difficulty of applying the misattribution manip­
ulation when the stimulus (shock) was most salient and subjects were 
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highly aroused. Consistent with the Brehm discussion, the authors 
interpreted their results as indicating that high arousal precludes the 
use of misattribution to reduce fear. 
Other studies have also demonstrated that subjects can be per­
suaded to misattribute stimulus-produced arousal to an irrelevant exter­
nal source, and that often the intensity of an emotional experience will 
diminish for an individual if this arousal is attributed to a nonemo-
tional source. Ross, Rodin, and Zimbardo (1969) produced both a de­
crease in fear of anticipated shock and a difference in shock-avoidance 
behavior due to fear reduction, by providing white noise as a misattri­
bution stimulus. 
Dienstbier and Munter (1971) produced in the laboratory a natur­
ally induced emotion (fear and/or guilt arousal in a cheating situation) 
and used misattribution principles to create a nonspecific arousal in a 
placebo group. Subjects who were told to expect arousal from a pill 
cheated more than subjects expecting mild side-effects. The authors 
reasoned that individuals misattributinq their natural arousal to the 
pill no longer felt the inhibition which guilt or fear usually produce. 
A study by London and Monello (1974) went a step further in 
broadening the notion of what cues may affect the cognitive labeling of 
emotions. Subjects performing a task were misled as to how rapidly or 
slowly the time passed. The differences in this internal cue (the feel­
ing of time passing) resulted in differences between conditions in repor­
ted emotional states. Subjects who were cued that time passed quickly 
later rated the task as more interesting than did the slow-time group. 
12 
Autonomic Activity as a Source of Cognitive Information 
The previously cited research has demonstrated how reattribution 
can be produced by manipulation of an apparent source of arousal. The 
reattribution process can also be put into operation by manipulating the 
apparent degree of arousal. In this type of paradigm, an externally-
supplied indication of physiological arousal is the standard tool by 
which reattribution effects are achieved. The following studies provide 
illustrations of this principle. 
Berkowitz and Turner (1974) supplied subjects with feedback from 
an "anger-meter" after they had been exposed to an experimental situa­
tion in which they were either provoked by an experimental confederate 
or approached on a neutral basis. The subjects were led to believe 
that the meter could correctly identify their level of anger by means of 
the physiological apparatus which was attached to their bodies. After 
receiving high or low anger feedback, subjects were required to give 
shocks to the provoker or neutral target. A significant relationship 
was noted between the level of anger feedback and the shocks which were 
subsequently delivered in the "provoker" situation. Subjects responded 
to the information supplied them regarding their internal state of an­
ger by behaving in a way appropriate to their level of "anger." 
In a 1966 study, Valins cleverly demonstrated the misattribu­
tion effect produced by cues not derived from actual internal states. 
Male subjects were shown pictures of "Playboy" nudes while listening to 
feedback of their own supposed heart rate, which was actually a con­
trolled tape of heart-like sounds. During the presentation of some 
random pictures, subjects heard their "heartbeat" change to a rapid 
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frequency, while the rest of the pictures (controls) produced a return 
to a relatively stable heartrate. Later, the pictures seen in the pre­
sence of rapid heartbeat feedback were rated by the subjects as more 
attractive than the control pictures. 
A follow-up to this study (Valins, 1972) employed the same para­
digm, but carried the study a step further by informing subjects during 
debriefing as to the false nature of the heartbeat feedback. Even so, 
on later re-ratings of the same nudes, debriefed subjects still held to 
their earlier ratings of prefered nudes. According to Valins, the sur­
prising tenacity of the misattribution effect which was illustrated by 
his work suggested that subjects cognitively accept the experimentally 
supplied misinformation. In line with this thinking, Valins postulated 
a "self-persuasion" hypothesis. He suggested that subjects in a reat­
tribution situation do not engage in a simple passive acceptance of the 
new cognitive input, but rather conduct an active hypothesis-testing 
strategy. Subjects must prove to themselves that they have appropri­
ately managed their cognitive cues. If their immediate experience just­
ifies the new cognition, reattribution will occur. 
In the case of his own study, Valins maintained that subjects 
hearing the rapid heartrate feedback generated a hypothesis that the 
nude was particularly attractive. It v/as easy for them to subsequently 
confirm this hypothesis by visually searching the pictures for the ex­
ceptional features which caused such increased heartrate. A similarity 
to self-perception theory can be recognized here. 
Valins also maintained that due to the cognitive effort involved 
in this self-persuasion process, the attitude produced by it will be 
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difficult to change. Also, the self-persuasion concept can feasibly 
explain the research results which have not produced the reattribution 
effects intended. Subjects who cannot satisfactorily confirm their 
hypotheses through immediate experience will not reattribute causation. 
There is also a possibility that behavior or an attitude may change in a 
given direction momentarily, but given no connitive confirmation, will 
quickly return to its prior state. An implication for further reattri­
bution attempts, then, is to provide the subjects with an adequate 
opportunity for self-persuasion to occur, in order to optimize the 
maintenance of the effects. 
Barefoot and Straub (1971) provided support for Valins1 proposal 
that the process of hypothesis testing needs time in order to solidify 
effects. Employing Valins' paradigm, subjects were given either long or 
short exposure times to view the pictures. Appropriately controlled 
findings showed that long-exposure subjects, who had more time for a 
visual search, responded to the misattribution orocess more so than did 
short-exposure subjects. Koenig and Henrikson (1974), to be discussed 
more fully later in this chapter, also replicated Valins1 data. These 
researchers similarly manipulated degree of arousal to produce the 
reattribution phenomenon. 
The role of physioloqical arousal as a determinant of emotion 
was examined in a two-part study by Goldstein, Fink, and fiettee (1972). 
In the initial phase of the study, the Valins false heartrate procedure 
was replicated, along with which a measure of each subject's actual 
heartrate was taken. The expected Valins effect occurred, however it 
was noted that the relationship between the subjects' reports of 
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emotionality and their true heartrate was not particularly strong. The 
authors concluded that actual physiological arousal was not a strong 
mediator in subsequent self-reports of emotionality in this situation. 
In the second part of the study, the experimenters varied the 
situation by manipulating the level of emotion. They found that only in 
the "hiqh-emotionality" condition did a significant relationship occur 
between actual heartrate and reported emotionality. The authors there­
fore reasoned that in a low-emotion situation, which they feel is repre­
sented by the Valins paradigm, an individual may rationally evaluate 
cognitive information to reach a conclusion about his emotionality, and 
in this process a "mimic effect" (the actual deviation of the heartrate 
from baseline due to the heard heartrate) may occur, but its effect on 
reported emotionality will be minimal. On the other hand, the authors 
state, in highly emotional situations neither a Valins effect nor a 
mimic effect is observed, but rather a direct link between actual heart-
rate and emotionality is established. Cognitive cues are, in effect, 
overridden in determining one's emotional state by the strono physiolo­
gical indicators present. 
A very recent study by Kerber and Coles (1973) replicated and 
also extended the "Valins effect." This paradigm included conditions 
designed to again assess the role of actual physioloaical state in 
affective ratings and also to determine the process by which the Valins 
effect occurs. Results indicated that actual physiological reactions 
played a minor role in affective ratings in this study. Also, in line 
with Valins' self-persuasion hynothesis, these affective ratings did 
appear to be guided by a directive search process instigated by the 
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perceived arousal. 
Impetus v/as also given to Valins' self-persuasion hypothesis by 
a 1969 Davison and Valins study. This research represented another 
misattribution technique, that of manipulating behavior to produce sub­
sequent reattribution. Subjects initially reported their tolerance 
threshold for shock pain, and subsequently were administered a placebo 
and two additional shock series. The first series of shock after the 
placebo had been ingested was presented to subjects as being similar in 
intensity to the pre-placebo series, although they were actually only 
half the intensity of the previous shocks. Subjects therefore incor­
rectly thought that they had withstood an average of twice as much 
shock in this series before reachinn their tolerance threshold. A 
reattribution manipulation was introduced at this point. In one condi­
tion, the participants were told that the pill they had taken was an 
effective pain-reducer. In an alternative condition, subjects were 
dehoaxed as to the nature of the pill. For the final shock series, 
administered at this point, subjects were led to believe that the pill 
effects had worn off. Results emerged as consistent with Valins' pre­
vious data. Dehoaxed subjects endured more shocks of greater intensity 
than did subjects in the "pain-reducer" condition. The maintenance of 
attitude toward the shock beyond the point of dehoaxing supported Valins' 
self-persuasion concept. 
Similarly, the data can be seen as consistent with Bern's self-
perception theory: The subjects' pain-enduring behavior was a basis for 
their judgments about the painfulness of the shock. This study alone 
does not permit the drawing of a conclusion regarding the mechanism by 
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which the evaluation of one's behavior affects attitude change or sub­
sequent behavior. However, attitude-change research produces data con­
sistent with this interpretation (Bern, 1967). 
The Interaction of Cognitive and Physiological Processes 
The enormous amount of research done over the last decade has 
aptly demonstrated the influence which external cues have on the label­
ing of internal states. Schachter's cognitive theory of emotion is sup­
ported by much of the literature. 
A particularly pertinent extension of this research concerns the 
actual physiological results of the interaction of cognitive and physio­
logical processes. The question of whether changes in the subjective 
reports, emotional labeling, and/or emotionally relevant behavior which 
is achieved through the reattribution process occurs with accompanying 
physiological changes was asked in 1972 by Beaman, Diener, Tefft, and 
Fraser, and in 1974 by Loftis and Ross. The answer to this inquiry, it 
was hoped, would in turn shed light on the question of whether such phy­
siological changes, if they occur, also sustain and facilitate changes 
in the non-physiological measures. 
Beaman, et al. examined the effects of the misattribution pro­
cess in the treatment of test anxiety. Highly test-anxious subjects in 
a testing situation were led to believe that their arousal was due to a 
placebo. These subjects subsequently significantly reduced their scores 
on a test anxiety scale. This behavior was maintained until the next 
experimental testing session, a period of 6 to 10 days. A series of 
four further studies by Svanum and Beaman (1974) pursued the notion that 
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actual personality traits, in this case anxiety, might be changed 
through manipulation of information presented to the subject. The stu­
dies employed Bern's l ie light paradigm (Bern, 1965) and results were in­
terpreted in line with Bern's self-perception theory. Briefly, highly-
anxious subjects were asked to read either a high-anxious statement in 
the presence of a l ie light, or a low-anxious statement in the presence 
of a truth light. As predicted, the data indicated that high-anxious 
individuals re-evaluated their anxiety after behavinq in a manner which 
indicated to them that they were not as highly anxious as they had be­
lieved. This was evidenced by reduced scores on a trait anxiety scale, 
which v/ere maintained over a two-week period. 
Additionally, the studies showed that the effects were less 
marked for persons who had less ambiguous data to process (high-anxious 
individuals reading high-anxious statements), and that an instructional 
set which indicated to subjects that their feelings were normal helped 
to reduce trait scores also. 
Employing a classical conditioning paradigm in two closely-
related studies, Loftis and Ross conditioned subjects to shocks, and 
then attempted to promote the misattribution of the shock-produced 
arousal to white noise. The dependent variable was assessed as the 
number of Galvanic Skin Responses (GSRs) to the conditioned stimulus 
(CS) during extinction trials. Results of the first experiment, in 
which the misattribution manipulation was included during extinction 
trials, showed that the misattribution group did extinguish the GSR more 
rapidly than did the control group. This study, along with Beaman, et 
al., illustrated two important points. First, physiological change can 
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accompany the reattributional process, and second, high arousal subjects 
do respond to misattribution manipulations. With reqard to the second 
point, as previously mentioned Nisbett and Schachter have reached the 
opposite conclusion on the basis of their 1966 study. 
The second study by Loftis and Ross further supported the appro­
priateness of their conclusions. Subjects here, as did those in the 
previous study, showed a significant response to the misattribution man­
ipulation, as evidenced by less resistance to extinction, even though 
the manipulation was now applied during the acquisition trials. Despite 
the unmistakable contingency between the CS and the conditioned and un­
conditioned responses, misattribution subjects still responded to that 
manipulation. Misattribution and the resultinq fear reduction were ac­
tually facilitated when the symptoms to be misattributed were most 
salient. 
Despite the apparent definitive results of these tv/o studies, 
only speculation can be made as to the exact process by which misattri­
bution occurs. Loftis and Ross sugqested that misattribution subjects 
changed their perceptions about the nature of their arousal only after 
the obvious stimulus-response contingency was removed. This after-the-
fact misattribution, similar in some respects to the self-persuasion 
hypothesis of Valins (1966), was tested by Loftis and Ross (1974b) in a 
third study. The same paradigm as before was employed, except that the 
independent variable (misattribution) manipulation was presented this 
time after both the acquisition trials and the presentation of white 
noise were terminated. The occurrence of "retrospective misattribution" 
was apparently evidenced by the significantly fewer conditioned respon­
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ses during extinction in the misattribution group. A problem with 
this interpretation exists however. A conceivable alternative explana­
tion for group differences in GSR responses is simply that subjects re­
ceiving a symptom list relevant to what arousal they were actually 
feeling were calmed by that information, producing their decreased GSR 
response without necessarily any reattribution to a neutral source. 
Checks on the subjects' self-reports regarding attributions of 
arousal in both of the latter experiments revealed that misattribution 
subjects reported significantly fewer arousal symptoms overall than the 
control group, but did not differ from the controls in their attribu­
tions of arousal symptoms to noise. These subjective checks, however, 
did not provide clear information, since they were confounded by being 
obtained after the independent variable manipulation. 
Calvert-Boyanowsky and Leventhal (1975) made an attempt to tease 
out the role of information in reattribution research. Two experiments 
replicating and extending Ross, Rodin, and Zimbardo (1969) were con­
ducted to determine whether reductions in emotional behavior actually 
result from misattribution of arousal to a neutral source, or rather 
from simple informational factors which have been confounded in the pre­
vious studies. 
Two conditions were added to the Ross, et al. paradigm. Faced 
with the threat of electric shock, subjects were given information about 
either relevant or irrelevant arousal symptoms, which were attributed 
to either white noise or to threat of shock. In the first study, sub­
jects who received arousal information avoided shock less (the depen­
dent variable), regardless of attribution to shock or noise. However, 
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no differences in actual attributions of arousal were found between 
arousal and no-arousal groups in a check on manipulations. 
The second study showed similar results, with the additional 
finding that arousal information must be presented in a plausible con­
text in order to produce the effects (reduced shock avoidance). Again, 
subjects' verbal reports failed to offer evidence that they were misat-
tributing their arousal to a neutral source. The authors concluded that 
the effects obtained were not the result of a misattribution to a neu­
tral source, but instead the product of the information given which was 
received in a plausible context and assessed by the individual using a 
form of reality-testing. The authors suggested on the basis of this 
lack of verbal reporting of reattribution, that causal ascriptions of 
arousal states are not so easily manipulated as researchers may have 
previously supposed. Furthermore, they concluded that the context in 
which arousal symptom information is presented is an important deter­
minant of subsequent behavior, since information which confirms the 
individual's perceived reality will reduce arousal, while information 
which is at variance with the individual's perceived reality may pro­
duce higher levels of arousal. The authors believe that this will be 
true, whether or not the information received incorporates causal infor­
mation. Therefore, they suggested, if physiological arousal varies as 
a function of type of information provided and of the individual's 
reality testing of it, attributions would not be meaningful. 
The 1974 research of Koenig and Henrikson was an additional 
demonstration of the effects of cognitive information upon physiologi­
cal functioning. Briefly, in the study subjects were classically con­
ditioned to respond to a CS with GSR as the dependent variable. The 
cognitive information next supplied to the participants indicated to 
them that they possessed either high or low galvanic skin-responsiveness. 
This experimenter-control led (false) feedback produced a difference 
between conditions in subsequent maintenance of GSR during extinction 
trials. Subjects informed of high galvanic skin responsiveness actually 
maintained their GSR at a higher level than did subjects in the alter­
native condition. 
A critical finding of these studies for researchers interested 
in pursuing applied techniques of reattribution is that high levels of 
autonomic arousal may facillitate the process of misattribution and 
actually result in fear reduction. A theoretical step forward was 
achieved also, with the evidence provided that physiological processes 
can be affected by interaction with cognitive factors. The process by 
which this occurs, however, has not been unequivocally demonstrated. 
Several research teams have approached the question of how the reattri­
bution mechanism works. Among these are Loftis and Ross (1974), Valins 
(1966, 1972), Davison and Valins (1969), and Barefoot and Straub (1971), 
which have been previously presented. Additional attempts at interpre­
tation include the work of Calvert-Boyanowsky and Leventhal (1975) and 
the following study by Cantor, Zillmann, and Bryant (1975). 
An equally feasible, alternative explanation of the reattri­
bution process was offered by Cantor, Zillmann, and Bryant (1975), 
based on Zillmann's "excitation-transfer theory" (1971). Zillmann pos­
tulated that "the critical components of an excitorary response decay 
relatively slowly and often remain operative after the individual has 
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adjusted cognitively to novel stimulation" (1975, p. 69). The essence 
of misattribution, then, according to Zillmann, lies in an individual's 
failure to distinguish between his excitation from a prior arousal v/hen 
that salient stimulus is replaced by the reattributional stimulus. 
The 1975 research by Cantor, et al. convincingly demonstrated 
the reattribution of arousal from physical exercise to that of sexual 
arousal. Subjects shown an erotic film just moments after pursuing a 
vigorous physical exercise expressed less sexual excitation from the 
film, than did subjects who were given a recovery period after the exer­
cise. The latter subjects were assumed to have forgotten the salient 
stimulus of physical exertion, and thus attributed their lingering arou­
sal to the film. Unfortunately, this research failed to achieve results 
in a crucial area: It was expected, on the basis of Zillmann's theory, 
that the "no-recovery" group should attribute their arousal appropri­
ately to the salient stimulus of physical activity. The attributions of 
this group however, showed no significant difference in attributions 
from a no-arousal group (control). It appeared that Cantor, et al. 
replicated the standard results of previous reattribution researchers, 
but failed to display the mechanics by which the reattribution process 
occurs. 
This failure to demonstrate the specific mechanics of the 
misattribution process v/as pointed out in a subsequent article by Suls 
(1976). Suls stated that without the actual attribution differences 
between groups exhibited in the data, the results of such studies can 
also be explained by Berlyne's theory of collative motivation. 
Berlyne's theory stresses that changes in the momentary level of 
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arousal determines the quality and quantity of emotional response. The 
responses of the "recovery" group in Cantor, et al.'s study can then be 
interpreted as having resulted from the rapid increase-decrease "arousal 
jag" which they were subject to, as compared to those subjects in a 
state of constant arousal who did not experience such a marked change. 
Therapeutic Applications of Reattribution Principles 
Research in the area of attribution, especially with regard to 
self-perception, has demonstrated the important role which perceived cau­
sality plays both in the interpretation of our emotional behavior and in 
the subsequent effects of that interpretation. The process by which an 
individual places an emotional label on a state of physiological arousal 
is subject, we have seen, to cues from the environment regarding such 
factors as the source and level of arousal. Given the,tremendous effect 
these cues have been shown to have on the individual's self-perception, 
it is hardly surprising that some researchers have turned their atten^ 
tion toward application of reattributional principles to correct what 
may be an inappropriate or detrimental causal attribution in the cog­
nitive framework of certain individuals. 
A classic study in reattribution was performed by Storms and 
Nisbett in 1970. Their results represented an illustration of 
Schachter's cognitive theory of emotion applied to the alleviation of 
insomnia. Assuming that insomniacs have difficulty in getting to sleep 
because they are highly aroused at bedtime and associate that arousal 
with anxiety, the authors reasoned that if that arousal could be misat-
tributed to an emotionally-neutral cause (in this case a pill) the 
result might be a reduction in emotionality and a subsequent lessening 
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of sleep difficulties. The results of the study confirmed this expec­
tation. Subjects given placebos to take at bedtime, who were told to 
expect arousal symptoms from the pill, subsequently went to sleep sooner 
than usual, while subjects who were told to expect relaxation symptoms 
took longer to get to sleep than their normal pattern. The former group 
presumably attributed their arousal to the pill rather than to their ov/n 
emotions and as a consequence reduced their emotionality to the point 
where they actually went to sleep faster. The latter group, expecting 
relaxation, apparently attributed their high arousal at bedtime to 
worse-than-usual insomnia symptoms. The authors suggested that insomnia 
results from a cycle which includes an occurrence of symptoms, followed 
by worrying about those symptoms, and finally, consequent exacerbation 
of symptoms. Breaking this cycle, by means of a misattribution to an 
external stimulus, may be helpful in treatment of such a problem, as 
illustrated in the "arousal" group of Storms and Nisbett. 
The results of Storms and Nisbett's study contradicted what 
might be expected if the subjects had. been simply responding to sug­
gestion. That is, subjects expecting relaxation did not respond to 
suggestion by relaxing, nor did subjects expecting arousal demonstrate 
increased arousal as would be expected from a suggestion effect. The 
reason for this logically appeared to be that the insomniacs were quite 
familiar with their usual symptoms or arousal level, and as such, had 
important baseline information available, against which to draw con­
clusions about the effectiveness of the pill. The availability of base­
line information has been shown to be an important operator in the 
"negative placebo effect." Studies by Rickels, et al. (1965, 1967) have 
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indicated that the subjects who exhibit such an effect (contrary to what 
may be expected by suggestion) are consistently those with the greatest 
awareness of typical symptom level. This effect was actually detri­
mental when it occured in the "relaxation" group of the Storms and 
Nisbett study. Symptoms actually worsened, in contrast to a typical 
placebo effect. Subjects apparently infered a deterioration of their 
state due to the lack of improvement which they had expected. 
The results of this Storms and Nisbett experiment have been 
conceptually replicated a number of times (e.g. Ross, et al., 1969; 
Dienstbier and Munter, 1971), however, they have not gone unchallenged 
in the literature. Kellogg and Baron (1975), using the same paradigm, 
failed to replicate the original findings. Rather, their results sug­
gested a typical placebo reaction. Additionally these authors included 
a high and low-justification manipulation in the design, a factor which 
approached significance, indicating a possibility that subjects made 
attributions not only about the cause of their arousal, but also about 
the reasons for their behavior. 
An experiment conducted by Bootzin, Herman, and Nicassio (1976) 
attempted to replicate and delimit the effects found by Storms and 
Nisbett through a variation in the focus of instructions given to the 
insomniacs. In their paradigm, different sets of instructions were 
given to subjects in each of four experimental groups with regard to the 
effects which each group should expect from ingestion of the pill. 
Subjects in one group received information that indicated physiological 
arousal as a side effect of the pill; instructions to another group 
stressed relaxation as an effect; a third group received information 
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which stated that an increase in sleep onset latencies would occur; and 
the last group was told to expect a decrease in sleep onset latencies. 
The authors predicted that the reverse placebo effect would occur when 
the pill 's effects were described as affecting arousal, and that a 
direct suggestion effect would result from a description of the pill as 
affecting sleep onset latency. The results of the study, consistent 
with those of Kellogg and Baron rather than Storms and Nisbett, showed 
that a direct suggestion effect was in operation regardless of the 
focus of instructions. Singerman, 3orkovec, and Baron (1976), using 
highly anxious speech phobics also reported results similar to those of 
Kellogg and Baron. 
The manipulation of a source of arousal also created thera­
peutic reattribution effects in a study by Beaman, et al. (1974). These 
researchers, as previously discussed, were able to reduce test anxiety 
in subjects and maintain that behavior over a one-week period. Test 
anxiety was also reduced in a study by Meichenbaum (1972) through a 
cognitive modification treatment procedure, in which highly anxious 
subjects were made aware of their anxiety-engendering self-statements. 
Rodin (1976) noted the effects of differential causal attri­
butions between groups in her examination of the performance levels of 
menstruating and non-menstruating women. Experimentally aroused, the 
former group performed significantly better than the group which had no 
menstrual symptoms. It was suggested that the latter group did not 
have a salient alternative attribution for the task-relevant arousal, 
while the former did. The results suggested the beneficial effects of 
predictability and perceived normality of physiological symptoms upon 
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performance. 
The findings of Calvert-Boyanowsky and Leventhal (1975) and 
Dienstbier (1972), previously mentioned, illustrated the importance of 
appropriate symptom information in the reduction of emotionality. The 
research indicated that information at variance with a person's perceived 
reality may result in high levels of emotionality. On the other hand, 
an attribution of normality may affect behavioral response in a positive 
way by reducing the negative emotionality (Svanum & Beaman, 1974). The 
reattribution therapy of Davison (1966) represented the application of 
this principle, in the treatment of individuals whose problematic 
behavior could be thought of as a function of inaccurate causal labeling. 
One case involved a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic who was troubled by 
"pressure points" in his temples, which he attributed to "spirits." 
Through a combination of relaxation and reattribution training, Davison 
was able to persuade the patient more appropriately to attribute the 
pain to severe muscle tension brought on by situational pressures. 
Brenden Maher (1970) extended this reattribution therapy to 
further limits by suggesting that schizophrenics are victims of oercep-
tual disorders as might be caused by a faulty recticular system. Maher 
maintained that schizophrenics should be given an opportunity to reattri-
bute their bizarre perceptual experiences to this nonemotional physiolo­
gical source, thereby helping them to explain their behavior "normally" 
and subsequently to reduce their negative self-perceptions. 
The manipulation of the apparent degree of arousal has also been 
a useful tool in certain areas of therapy. Valins and Ray (1966), for 
example, extended the previous findings of Valins (1966) regarding 
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misattribution of autonomic feedback, employing these principles in the 
area of systematic desensitization. Snake-phobic subjects were provided 
with bogus heart-rate feedback, in which the heart beat showed increases 
during periods when a subject received shock and a regular pattern during 
presentations of snake pictures. The authors predicted that subjects 
would infer from the feedback that while they were afraid of shocks, the 
snakes did not produce the level of anxiety that they previously ex­
pected. On the basis of later increased snake-approach behavior, the 
authors' expectations were confirmed. Two experiments which have pro­
vided evidence consistent with this false-feedback effect are Borkovec, 
Wall, and Stone (1974) with public speaking anxiety and Koenig (1973) 
with test anxiety. 
The application of both Kelley's principle of control and Bern's 
self-perception principle for therapeutic purposes and its subsequent 
positive effects, can be recognized in the work of Schulz (1976), Schulz, 
and Hanusa (1978), Langer and Rodin (1976) arid Rodin and Langer (1977). 
These studies examined the effects of varying degrees of perceived con­
trol and predictability on the well-being of the institutionalized aged. 
In the Schulz study, the author attempted to create varying degrees of 
control and predictability in groups of residents through three 
conditions in which the subjects received visitors. The three conditions 
employed ranged from one in which extreme control was given to the sub­
jects as to the frequency and duration of the visits they received, to a 
condition in which visits were random (yoked control). Two months after 
the manipulations began, measurements indicated that subjects in the 
high prediction-and-control group were significantly superior in physical 
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and psychological status. 
In the Rodin and Langer studies, in a similar setting subjects 
were also found to respond favorably to experimental manipulations which 
emphasized taking responsibility for their own care. Home residents in a 
responsibility-induced group became more active and happier than did a 
comparison group who were instructed that care responsibilities were in 
the hands of the hospital staff. The long-range outcomes of these stu-
ies differed substantially however. A follow-up to Schulz's study at 
24, 30, and 42 months indicated a decline in the status of the residents 
who had previously made up the improved condition. The subjects in the 
no-control group remained stable over time, suggesting the possible 
harmful effects of the discontinued experimental manipulation. The bene­
ficial effects of the Rodin and Langer manipulation, on the other hand, 
were maintained after 18 months. This difference was attributed to the 
different cognitive effects of the two studies. The Schulz subjects 
could only attain control of an unstable factor (visits) while the Rodin 
and Langer patients saw themselves gaining control of their own care. 
This last factor could be self-attributed as a stable factor, therein 
producing maintenance effects even after the termination of the exper­
iment itself. 
In summary, reattribution principles have been shown to be 
effective as applied through a variety of strategies. In some cases, 
persons can be convinced that they are not aroused or are less aroused 
than they had thought, thereby reducing the neqative emotionality which 
can exacerbate problematic symptoms. Individuals can also learn to 
readjust inappropriate causal attributions to more correct internal or 
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external factors. Along with this often goes the approach of changing an 
"abnormal" attribution to a normal one, with the hope of reducing the 
parallel negative emotionality. Finally, if healthy attributions can be 
made and/or healthy behaviors performed, a strategy which implements 
self-perception principles can help to maintain these responses. 
Psychologically-oriented Approaches to the Reduction of Dental Anxiety 
A variety of techniques have been employed in the dental office 
by recent researchers in attempts to reduce the negative emotionality of 
the dental experience. Due to the recognition that early experience is 
important in the formation of dental fears, one initial research strategy 
has been to formulate methods of non stressful introduction to the dental 
procedure to be used with children during their first encounter with the 
dentist. Such an approach was used by Rosengarten (1961) in a study in 
which children were brought to the dentist's office for a previsit before 
the date of their actual treatment. By providing a simple explanation 
of the dental tools and procedures used, Rosengarten hoped to provide an 
innocuous introduction to the dental office for the children. He found 
that children from ages three to four-and-one-half years benefited signi­
ficantly from the previsit experience (as judged by their later dental 
chair behavior) while older children (five years) showed no positive 
effects above control baselines. A similar technique was used by Laufer, 
Rosenzweig, and Chosack (1964) with six and seven-year-old girls. The 
previsit, as compared to a non-previsit group, was found to significantly 
reduce fear at the time of the subsequent treatment, as measured by pulse 
rate and blood pressure. These effects are interpreted as having 
resulted from the desensitization to the dental situation which the 
previsit supposedly provided. 
Another method for introducing a child to dentistry in a positive 
way is through model learning. Research using this technique generally 
involves having the child patient view a videotape in which another child 
exhibits positive behavior during dental treatment and is verbally rein­
forced by the dentist. In a 1974 study, Machen and Johnson exposed pre­
school children to either desensitization therapy (explanation and intro­
duction of the office procedure) or model learning therapy before under­
going dental treatment. The two groups displayed similar levels of sig­
nificantly less negative behavior during their subsequent treatments on 
both a second and third visit, than did a control group. 
In 1975, Melamed, Hawes, Heiby and Glick found that, compared to 
a group viewing an unrelated film, children who observed a film of a peer 
model coping with the dental treatment, themselves demonstrated more 
cooperative and less disruptive behaviors as they underwent similar sub­
sequent treatment procedures. The modeling group was rated by the dental 
staff as less anxious also, although physiological and self-report 
indices of arousal did not differ across situations. An additional study 
by Melamed (1976) indicated that peer modeling of the specifics of the 
dental experience was a more effective way to achieve such results than 
was supplying the same information without a model. 
The effectiveness of modeling with children having prior dental 
experience was investigated by Cherlock and Bornstein (1979) using both 
single and multiple models presented in separate conditions as either 
consistently or progressively nonanxious. Rather than viewing a film, 
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the children in this study were asked to imagine the scenes appropriate 
to their experimental condition. Results using this covert modeling 
method indicated that the children in all conditions, including the con­
trol, consistently reduced anxiety. The type and number of models visu­
alized did not significantly affect behavioral anxiety reduction. 
Modeling has been one strategy applied to adult dental patients 
also. Shaw and Thoresen (1974) used a combination of relaxation and 
modeling with adult dental phobics and found that this combined tech­
nique produced a significant increase in the number of patients who had 
their dental work completed, as compared to a control group. Along with 
this behavioral change, a significant reduction in reported arousal and 
an improvement in attitudes toward the dental experience were produced. 
These researchers also employed a technique of systematic desensitization 
with an additional group of patients. This latter method used an audio­
tape which guided patients through a series of imageries along with a 
relaxation exercise. Results indicated that desensitization was also 
effective in producing positive behavioral change and reduced arousal in 
self-report measures. The modeling method did, however, produce a trend 
toward more positive attitude and behavior change than the desensiti­
zation procedure (p = .14). 
Wroblewski, Jacob, and Rehm (1977) assessed the contribution of 
relaxation instructions to this combined procedure of modeling and relax­
ation mentioned above. In a comparison study of a modeling group, a 
modeling-plus-relaxation group, and a placebo group, no differences 
emerged between groups with regard to self-reports of anxiety. However, 
the addition of relaxation to modeling produced a dramatic improvement 
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in the related goal behavior (obtaining subsequent dental care). 
In summary, both overt symbolic modeling and desensitization 
have been used effectively in the dental situation to produce desired 
change on behaviorally based measures. Results of research are a bit 
more variable with regard to possible changes above control group base­
line in measures of staff observational ratings and patients' self-
reports of anxiety and attitudes. Studies have noted the maintenance of 
achieved treatment effects for these techniques which range from three to 
twelve weeks. 
Additional research, performed by Corah, Bissell, and Ill ig 
(1979) suggested that relaxation and distraction techniques may be 
effective in alleviating dental anxiety. In the relaxation condition of 
this study, subjects listened throughout their dental treatment to a 
tape recording of relaxation instructions. In the distraction condition, 
patients in treatment were able to play a video "ping-pong" game on a 
moniter mounted above the dental chair. Subsequent ratings by patients 
indicated that both techniques reduced stress below the level of a con­
trol group. Also, the research indicated that perceived control (as 
produced through the use of a stop button controlled by the patient) 
was ineffective in reducing anxiety. 
CHAPTER 2 
RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY 
The possible positive therapeutic effects of the application of 
reattribution principles, and also the limitations of such, are sug­
gested in the previously cited literature. These principles appear to 
be most appropriately applied in a situation where individual adjustment 
difficulties are at least partially a result of a labeling, or attri-
butional process. Often a redirection of an individual's attention to 
alternative causal factors proves to be a helpful step toward reassess­
ment of the problem by the individual and possible reduction of negative 
emotionality. The present study is an attempt to apply the principles 
established by the attribution literature to a common problematic sit­
uation, where possible positive consequences may result from their 
application. 
To a great number of persons, a visit to the dentist's office 
is an experience laden with anxiety. The arousal symptoms which accom­
pany dental treatment very easily can be attributed to the most salient 
stimulus in the situation--the dentist and fear of the dental treatment. 
However, as Valins and Nisbett (1972) point out, while fear is no doubt 
a major source of the arousal symptoms, due to the conditioning which 
has occured in the past, the physiological activity which is part of the 
experience of fear can also be caused by a typically unrecognized 
factor, the physiological effect of the local anesthetic used. 
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Dentists often inject an anesthetic solution v/hich includes a vasocon-
stricter, typically epinephrine (adrenalin). This is needed to retard 
the absorption of the anesthetic, in order to maintain its effectiveness. 
The epinephrine commonly produces arousal symptoms in a patient which, 
as Schachter (1962) suggested, creates a need in the individual for 
explanation. It is quite likely that the emotional label subsequently 
applied to this autonomic arousal by most dental patients is "fear", 
despite the fact that this attribution may be somewhat inappropriate. 
It is a short step in logic to recognize the potential effects 
which might be achieved through reattribution, by simply informing 
patients of the drug's physiological side-effects. This information 
might reduce the tendency of the individuals to interpret their arousal 
as indicative of high anxiety. Quite possibly then, an aroused patient 
who can reattribute autonomic arousal at least partially to a neutral 
source (the drug) may leave the office under the impression that he/she 
has felt less fear than usual. A further implication from the Beaman, 
et al. (1972) and Loftis and Ross (1974) studies is that a reattri­
bution of arousal may even serve to subsequently reduce those physio­
logical effects which actually have been increased by applying a label 
of fear to one's emotional state. 
The present study, then, is basically an attempt to demonstrate 
a reattribution process in a dental office. No deception is necessary 
in the experimental manipulation and a successful application of such 
would appear to be beneficial to both patients and dentist. A 
further aim of the study is to identify the type of individual who is 
most responsive to the reattribution process in this situation, and to 
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assess the relative effects and merits of the application of the 
reattribution process. This study will also provide a basis for follow-
up work regarding the maintenance of any attitude or behavior change 
which may be produced through reattribution. Although the results of 
this experiment will no doubt be somewhat situation-specific, it may 
provide data which can suggest both use of its princioles in other 
applied areas, and an extension of basic theoretical statements. 
An experiment performed by Zuckerman (1974) has previously 
tested this possibility of reattribution effects in the dental office. 
However, crucial methodological flaws and a subsequent lack of inter-
pretable results suggests that a refined study is appropriate. The 
Zuckerman study included both an injected-informed group, as suggested 
above, and an alternative group in which subjects were informed that 
arousal symptoms would be reduced by the injection (injected-misinformed 
group). The author expected that: (1) The former group, by attri­
buting their arousal to the injection, would subsequently decrease 
anxiety, and (2) the latter group, when experiencing arousal that they 
did not expect, would attribute it to dental fear, thereby increasing 
their reported anxiety. Results of the study failed to support either 
hypothesis, although a post-hoc analysis indicated that the hypothe­
sized effects did occur in those subjects who initially reported high 
pre-treatment anxiety. This outcome is surprising in light of previous 
research (Conger, et al., 1976; Klemp ?< Leventhal, 1972; Nisbett & 
Schachter, 1966) in which highly-anxious subjects v/ere least responsive 
to a reattribution manipulation. Such studies represent a discouraning 
finding in terms of possible clinical applications of reattribution 
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theory. However, as previously noted, Beaman, et al. (1972) and 
Loftis and Ross (1974) did successfully manipulate the responses of 
highly-anxious subjects. 
With regard to Zuckerman's findings for the dental situation, 
it appears quite possible that subjects who are given a plausible alter­
native explanation for their arousal symptoms will persuade themselves 
of the accuracy of this information if the arousal symptoms are present 
to validate their cognitions. This is the process postulated by Valins' 
self-persuasion hypothesis. The individuals affected by the manipula­
tion in this case would be those who definitely display arousal symptoms 
while low-arousal subjects may disregard the information as inaccurate. 
Also, if the retrospective reattribution theory of Loftis and 
Ross is credible, it is possible that pre-treatment high-arousal sub­
jects could also compare and relate the new cognitive input to their 
past experience more readily than could low-arousal subjects, and recog­
nizing the feasibility of the new information, make a reattribution of 
their arousal. On the other hand, Zuckerman's results were based com­
pletely on post-hoc examination of the data. As such they must be 
approached with caution, despite their encouraging therapeutic impli­
cations. It appears important now to provide a definitive statement as 
to the possibility of reducing fear in highly anxious dental patients. 
The present study will attempt to do so. 
As mentioned, the original Zuckerman dental study contained a 
worthwhile basic design, but numerous shortcomings also, which will be 
addressed in the present study. Simple changes, such as a stronger 
manipulation and a more direct check of its effectiveness, tighter 
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controls on extraneous variables, the addition of two blind raters for 
behavioral observation, and a sharper conceptual differentiation between 
physiological arousal and labeled emotion, could help to produce the 
desired reattribution effects for the present design and pinpoint the 
mechanics of its process. Also, additional pre-treatment information 
will be gathered in this study, regarding past dental experience and 
arousal levels. Finally, as mentioned previously, the groundwork will 
be laid for follow-up work regarding the maintenance of attitude or 
behavioral change. 
The basic paradigm will involve two experimental conditions plus 
a control group. In the first condition, subjects will be informed of 
the physiological effects of their injection (Drug-informed group). 
It is predicted that subjects in this group will reattribute the cause 
of at least a part of their arousal to the neutral source provided (the 
drug injected) and will therefore perceive themselves as having felt 
less fear in the dental chair than will the control group. It is also 
feasible that subjects in the informed group might reduce their actual 
arousal as a result of the reattribution process. A measure for this 
possible effect will be taken. 
The second experimental group will be a "normality" condition, 
in which subjects will be informed that their reactions to the dental 
situation are normal. This condition will serve as a comparison for 
the informed group in that it may help to tease out the effects which a 
reattribution to normality may produce, and to compare the magnitude of 
this effect to that which is present in the reattribution to drug. It 
is predicted that the subjects in this Normality condition also will 
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reduce their attributions of arousal to fear, however the extent of this 
effect relative to that of the Drug-informed group is not predicted at 
this time. In the Normality condition, as in the Drug-informed group, 
it is possible that reported arousal may be reduced as a result of the 
reattribution to normality, and such effects in comparison to the con­
trol group will be examined. 
CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
Overview of Experimental Design 
The present study attempted to assess the possible effects of 
information provided to dental patients regarding the physiological 
side-effects of an injection of a local anesthetic agent, xylocaine 
(novocaine), on their subsequent subjective reports of arousal and their 
causal attributions for the arousal. In each of three dental offices, 
three groups of patients were administered the drug as part of their 
regular treatment. After injection, one group of the patients was pro­
vided with information regarding the symptoms which are side-effects of 
the drug injected (Drug-informed group). A second group was provided 
with the same information regarding the symptoms of arousal, but was not 
informed as to the cause of such arousal--only that such symptoms are 
normal in the dental situation (Normality group). A final group was 
provided with no such information from the experimenter, thus repre­
senting the usual, non-experimental dental situation (Control group). 
Dependent measures included an assessment of each patient's 
arousal level which was provided independently by both the dentist and 
his chairside assistant, and a subjective report from the patient of 
felt arousal during treatment and his/her attributions of cause for the 
arousal. Data were also collected regarding the age and prior dental 
experience of the subject and pulse rate at the time of treatment. 
41 
42 
Finally, each patient provided a self-report of the usual level of arou­
sal felt during past dental experiences, and his/her perceived normality, 
level of self-focus, and reassurance felt during the present dental 
visit. 
The possibility of the maintenance of any attitude or behavior 
change due to the information was also assessed in this study. In one 
of the offices used for study, subjects returned for a regularly 
scheduled second dental appointment from one to three weeks after the 
original. This visit provided the opportunity to measure their arousal 
levels and causal attributions again to provide information about the 
maintenance of experimental effects over time. 
Subjects 
One hundred and fifty adult dental patients in three local 
dental offices served as subjects. Inclusion in the study was made on 
the basis of several criteria. First, in all cases subjects were chosen 
who had had no or very minimal contact with the particular office or 
dentist involved before the time of the experimental treatment session. 
Second, all of the patients chosen for the study were scheduled for 
treatment with an injection of a local anesthetic. Third, patients 
were chosen who were having a particular type of dental work performed, 
so as to keep the treatment variable controlled within each office. 
Treatments did vary between offices and results of the study were ana­
lyzed with this in mind. In Office 1, the student dental service on the 
university campus, the 60 patients (30 male, 30 female) were scheduled 
for routine operative dentistry with an injection of a local anesthetic. 
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Office 2 was that of an oral surgeon; therefore, subjects selected were 
those who were having minor oral surgery performed under a local anes­
thetic. Due to a shortage of available patients, only 15 males and 15 
females participated from this office. Office 3 was also that of an 
oral surgeon and similar procedures as with Office 2 were followed. 
This last office included 30 male and 30 female patients. 
Procedure 
At the time the subject was seated in the dental chair, the 
experimenter asked if he/she would take the time during the course of 
treatment to fil l out two questionnaires. The subjects were informed 
that their answers on the questionnaires would be confidential and that 
completion was voluntary. Subjects were led to believe that the exper­
imenter was a part of the office personnel and the questionnaires were 
a part of the normal routine of the office. As mentioned previously, 
patients chosen had l ittle or no experience with the offices included 
in the study so that the presentation of the questionnaire would not 
appear out of the ordinary. 
Pre-treatment questionnaire. The purpose of the first question­
naire was to obtain a self-report of the usual level of arousal felt by 
the patient in the dental chair. Data were also obtained regarding the 
extent of previous dental experience and age of the patient. This 
questionnaire was fil led out by the patient just after being seated in 
the dental chair (see Appendix A). 
Physiological measure. At the time that the first questionnaire 
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was completed, the experimenter noted the pulse rate of the patient. 
Independent variable. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions within each office. The groups were balanced for sex 
(half male, half female). In Condition 1 (Drug-informed) the experi­
menter entered the room a few minutes after the injection of xylocaine 
had been administered and verbally presented the following information: 
Do you feel any numbness in your mouth yet? Good, the doctor 
should be back in just a few minutes. Are you comfortable? JJust 
let us know if we can do something to help make you more comfort­
able. Okay? 
You will also, no doubt, feel some symptoms in your body which 
will be from the drug. The xylocaine that we use (you may have 
heard it called "novocaine"), just like most dentists, contains 
some adrenalin, which is the same substance that your body pro­
duces naturally at those times when you get suddenly excited or 
afraid. Do you know that feeling? So you might feel symptoms 
just like that--jitters, tenseness in your chest or stomach, 
butterflies in your stomach, sweaty palms or more perspiration, 
or some speeding-up of your breathing or heart rate. Some peo­
ple even feel a l ittle light-headed or dizzy from the drug. 
You might have noticed these symptoms when administered various-
types of novocaine before, too. Some people feel all of these 
symptoms and other people feel only a few of them. You may 
feel them at any time during the dental treatment—the drug 
works a bit differently for each person, but please remember 
that such feelings are the direct result of the drug admin­
istration. 
The same procedure was used in Condition 2, the Normality 
group, as in the previous case, except for the particular content of 
information presented: 
Do you feel any numbness in your mouth yet? Good, the doctor 
should be back in just a few minutes. Are you comfortable? Just 
let us know if we can do something to help make you more comfort­
able. Okay? 
People in the dental chair typically feel some arousal symp­
toms in their bodies, such as jitters, tenseness in the chest or 
stomach, sweaty palms or more perspiration, or some speeding-up 
of the breathing or heart rate, or butterflies in the stomach. 
Some people even feel a l ittle light-headed or dizzy. It's 
completely normal to feel that way. You might have noticed such 
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symptoms in the dental office before too. Some people feel all of 
these symptoms and other people feel only a few or none at all. 
It's a bit different for each person. 
For condition 3, the control group, the experimenter did not 
re-enter the room at this time. No information was given to the patient 
by the experimenter. This condition then represented the reoular routine 
of the office. 
Observer assessments. Both the dentist and the chairside assis­
tant provided independent ratings of each patient's display of arousal 
while in the dental chair. This allowed assessment of patient arousal 
other than by the self-report of the subject. Both dentist and assistant 
were blind to all three of the conditions (see Appendix B). 
Both the total length of time spent in the dental chair and the 
total length of time under actual treatment were recorded for each 
patient by the experimenter. 
Post-treatment questionnaire. (See Appendix C.) The second 
questionnaire was adminstered immediately after the dentist finished 
treatment. On this questionnaire subjects were asked to report the level 
of arousal which they had felt during the present treatment and to note 
whether they had felt any of a l ist of symptoms and the extent of each, 
if felt. They were also asked to attribute the cause of any arousal 
felt (from a l ist of causes provided). Finally, the questionnaire asked 
for self-report information with regard to the subject's perceived 
normality in this dental situation, his level of self-focus, and the 
reassurance he felt due to information provided to him. 
As a direct check on the manipulation, subjects were asked on the 
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questionnaire whether they had received information about the effects of 
the novocaine injection and to briefly summarize such information. This 
check assessed whether the information provided in the Drug-informed 
condition had been noted and retained by the patients in that particular 
group. Only one patient could not remember the basic contents of infor­
mation which had been provided and was therefore eliminated from the 
study. 
Follow-up measures. For the purpose of later assessment, follow-
up measures were recorded during a second visit for fourteen patients in 
Office 1. These individuals returned to the office for operative work 
one to three weeks after their initial (similar) treatment. The measures 
taken included a- pulse reading, as previously, and the completion of the 
same post-treatment questionnaire. Follow-up measures were not taken 
with all patients in all offices because of the fact that return visits 
within a reasonably short period of time were rare. 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Office 1 
Pre-treatment group differences. The pre-treatment data 
were first compared across the three conditions by means of analysis 
of variance. Results revealed that no significant differences existed 
between the means of the groups with regard to either past dental exper­
ience or typical arousal level (see Table 1). A pre-treatment differ­
ence did emerge (see Table 2) between the mean ages of the groups, 
£ (2,57) = 4.61, £ = .014, with the mean of the Drug-informed group 
significantly higher than the Normality group (26.55 vs. 23.00, 
Scheffe's Test, £<.05). Analysis of covariance was used in appropriate 
subsequent analyses to adjust for this initial discrepancy. 
The pulse of the patient, taken before the injection, served as 
a physiological data source for initial level of arousal. No signi­
ficant differences in mean pulse rate existed between conditions. Also, 
pulse rates did not correspond highly with typical arousal level 
(r_ = .04, £ = .76) or with the patients' self-reports of arousal felt 
at the present visit (r = -.006, £= .97). A significant positive corr­
elation was found between the pulse rate of the patient and the den­
tist's post-treatment rating of patient arousal level (r_= .32, 
£ = .01). A significant relationship was not found between pulse rate 
and the assistant's ratings (r. = .15, £= .26). 
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Length of treatment. Analyses indicated that no differences 
between group means existed with regard to the time spent in actual 
treatment during the present dental visit or the total time spent in the 
dental chair (see Table 3). 
Attributions of arousal. Initial analyses examined the effects 
of the independent variable manipulation (condition) on the patients' 
attributions for their arousal. A one-way analysis of variance indi­
cated a significant overall effect for attributions of arousal to the 
drug injection, £ (2,57) = 10.49, £ = .004. Subsequent Scheffe's tests 
performed on the means indicated that the Drug-informed condition 
differed from the Normality group (£<.05) and from the Control group 
(£<.05). The Normality and Control groups did not differ signifi­
cantly (see Table 4). 
A similar analysis of variance performed on the data repre­
senting subjects' attributions to fear (Table 5) revealed no significant 
differences between conditions, £ (2,57) = 1.78, £ = .18, although the 
mean of the Drug-informed group displayed a slinht trend in the hypo­
thesized direction. An analysis of covariance was used to adjust for 
the effect of typical arousal level of the patient, which was highly 
related to fear attributions (r_ = .64, £ = .001). The results indicated 
a stronger trend yet in the predicted direction, although this was not 
statistically significant, £ (2,56) = 1.53, £ = .23. In this latter 
case, the means for the Drug-informed, Normality, and Control groups 
were, respectively, 3.17, 4.36, and 3.78. 
Subjects' attributions for their arousal were also examined for 
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possible sex differences. The data indicated no siqnificant sex effects 
or interaction effects between sex and condition for either attributions 
to the drug, £ (1,54) = .31, p_ = .58, £ (2,54) = .42, £ = .66, or for 
attributions to fear, £(1,54) = .14, £ = .71, £(2,54) = .91, £ = .41, 
respectively. 
Arousal level. The effect of the experimental manipulation upon 
the subjects' self-reports of arousal experienced during the current 
visit was examined through an analysis of covariance. Given the initial 
mean age differences among the conditions and the high existing corre­
lation between age and arousal (r. = -.39, £ = .002), it was necessary to 
covary out the effect of age in this analysis. Results revealed no 
significant differences among the conditions, £ (2,56) = .47, £ = .63. 
The levels of each of the individual symptoms reported by 
patients on the post-treatment questionnaire were summed to produce an 
overall symptom level for each subject. Examination of this data found 
no mean symptom level differences between conditions. 
No sex differences or interactions between sex and condition 
appeared with regard to typical arousal level, £ (2,57) = .62, £ = .43, 
and £ (2,54) = .51, £-=.60, respectively, or present arousal level, 
£ (2,57) = .92, £= .34, and £ (2,53) = 2.01, £= .14, respectively. 
Within the conditions, a sex difference in arousal level was found to 
be significant in the Drug-informed condition and marginally significant 
in the Normality group, where in both cases males reported greater 
arousal than did females, £(1,17) = 5.26, £ = .035, and £ (1,17) = 
3.53, £ = .078, respectively. 
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The observational reports of the dentist and the assistant pro­
vided a second set of data regarding the patients' level of arousal, 
as illustrated in Table 3. The interrater reliability achieved between 
these independent raters was .35 (£_ = .007), however neither of these 
observational reports correlated significantly with the self-report of 
arousal offered by patients (r. = .19, £= .15; r_ = .21, o_ = .11, respec­
tively). An analysis of variance using these behavioral reports of 
arousal indicated that no significant mean differences existed between 
conditions with regard to the arousal displayed by patients. 
Additional measures. In order to assess the cognitive influ­
ences which the various experimental manipulations provided to the sub­
jects, self-reports were obtained from the patients with regard to their 
perceived levels of normality, self-focus, and reassurance felt during 
the experimental dental visit. An examination of each of these factors 
across conditions found no significant differences in any case (see 
Tables 7, 8, and 9). Also, no sex effects or sex by condition inter­
actions were found to exist for these variables. Thus, reassurance 
and/or a feeling of normality were not differentially experienced by any 
one group, nor was any one particular group of subjects more self-
focused than the others during their dental treatment. 
Within-condition analyses. Within the Drug-informed group, a 
regression analysis was employed to determine the contribution which 
symptom level, age, sex, arousal, treatment time, and self-focus made 
to an individual subject's level of attributions of arousal to the drug 
injection. None of these variables provided useful oredictive value. 
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A within-condition correlation matrix also indicated no significant 
i 
relationship between attributions to the drug and attributions to fear 
(r = .28, p_ = .23). 
Maintenance of effects. Data were collected at a follow-up visit 
made by fourteen of the patients (see Appendix E). An examination of 
the group means reveals no substantial changes in arousal levels or 
attributions of patients from their first to the second visit. It 
should be noted that three of the five patients in the Drug-informed 
group who did return for their second visit stil l attributed part of 
their arousal to the drug at that time. In fact, these three indivi­
duals reported that the drug was as much or more a source of their 
arousal as v/as fear. These attributions of arousal to the drug at the 
follow-up visit do not, however, represent a statistically significant 
difference effect over the other two conditions. 
Office 2 
Pre-treatment group differences. Analysis of the pre-treatment 
data revealed no significant differences between the means of the oroups 
with regard to age, past dental experience, typical arousal level, or 
pulse rate. The individual pulse rates recorded did not correlate sig­
nificantly with either the patients' self-reports of typical or present 
arousal levels (r = .17, £ = .37 and r = .27, £_ = .15, respectively). 
Similarly, no significant correspondence v/as observed between pulse 
rate of the patient and either the dentist's or assistant's behavioral 
rating of the patient (r = .29, p_ = .12, and r = .23, £_ = .21). 
A significant interaction effect between sex of the subject and 
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condition occurred for typical arousal level, F_ (2,24) = 3.56, D_ = .044. 
Females reported a significantly hioher denree of tynical arousal than 
did males within the Normality condition, F_ (1,8) = 5.76, p_ = .043. A 
reverse effect occurred in the Control qroup, where males reported an 
initial nonsignificantly higher typical arousal level, F (1,8) = 2.89, 
£ = .13. A minimally higher female mean occurred in the Drun-informed 
group. 
Length of treatment. No treatment differences were found among 
the groups, as evidenced by similar means on the variables of total time 
in the dental chair and total time in actual treatment (see Table 3). 
Attributions of arousal. A significant overall effect for attri­
butions of arousal to the drug injection was found through an analysis of 
variance, F (2,27) = 12.87, p_ = .0001, and a subsequent Scheffe's test 
indicated that the Drug-informed subjects were significantly hiqher than 
either of the other two groups (p <.05). As expected, the Normality and 
Control groups did not differ. 
An analysis of variance performed on the data of attributions to 
fear over the three conditions indicated no significant differences, 
£ (2,27) = .147, £ = .86. As with the previous office, however, the 
means of the Informed and Control groups were again in the predicted 
direction. As i l lustrated in Table 5, the mean of the Normality group 
in this case was also in the anticipated direction. An analysis of 
covariance which adjusted for typical arousal level of the patient moved 
the means even more strongly in the predicted direction, although as 
previously, not to the point of statistical significance, £ (2,26) = 
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= .58, p_ = .57. In this latter case the adjusted means of the Drug-
informed, Normality, and Control groups are, respectively, 3.44, 4.22, 
and 4.85. 
An examination of sex differences in the subjects' attributions 
of arousal revealed no significant main sex effects for either attri­
butions to the drug or attributions to fear, £ (1 ,24) = .045, £ = .83, 
and £ (1,24) = .004, p_ = .95, respectively. However, a significant 
interaction effect between sex and condition occurred with regard to 
attributions to fear, £ (2,24) = 4.83, £ = .017. In the Drug-informed 
and Normality conditions, females attributed more of their arousal to 
fear than did males, althounh this was not significant in either condi­
tion. The reverse effect was present in the Control group, where males 
reported significantly more fear attributions than did females, 
£ (1,8) = 8.07, p = .02. One-way anovas subsequently indicated that, 
over the conditions, neither the male or female pattern reached signi­
ficance with regard to attributions to fear, £ (2,12) = 3.51, £ = .065, 
£ (2,12) = 1.70, £ = .124, respectively. 
Arousal level. A one-way analysis of variance examined the 
effect of the experimental manipulation upon the subjects' self-reports 
of arousal and found no significant differences between conditions, 
£ (2,27) = .41, £= .67. Similar analyses performed with the obser­
vational data provided by the dentist and the dental assistant indi­
cated no significant differences between the groups on these measures 
either. The interrater reliability between the dentist and the 
assistant was significant at the .001 level (r = .85). In this office 
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the observational reports of the dentist and the assistant both corres­
ponded highly with the self-reports of arousal offered by the patients 
(r_ = .38, £ = .049, and r = .52, £ = .003, respectively). Aqain, 
symptom levels reported by the patients did not differ across the 
conditions nor were sex differences found in reported levels of present 
arousal. 
Additional measures. Checks made on the subjects' perceived 
levels of normality and self-focus indicated no differential effects 
across conditions. However, the subjects in the Drug-informed group 
did report a mean level of reassurance above that of the Normality group 
which was marginally significant (8.20 vs. 4.80, £ = .057). Further 
examination of this variable with the sex of the subject taken into 
account revealed significant condition, sex, and interaction effects, 
F (2,24) = 5.62, £ = .01, F (1,24) = 6.27, £ = .02, and F (2,24) = 
8.67, £= .001, respectively. An extreme sex difference in perceived 
reassurance level (£ <.0001) occurred in the Control group only, where 
males reported significantly less reassurance than did females. The 
Drug-informed and Control groups did not show significant sex differ­
ences in reassurance. 
Within-condition analyses. The regression analysis employed to 
determine the predictors of attributions to the drug injection indi­
cated that arousal level was the most influencial variable in this 
situation, _F (1,8) = 28.64, £<.01. A positive relationship was exhi­
bited between level of arousal and attributions to the drug (beta = 
.88, £= .001). Thus, the higher a subject's self-report of arousal, 
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the more l ikely he/she was to attribute that arousal to the drug 
injection. Arousal level accounted for 11% of the variance in the 
attributions to the drug. 
Office 3 
Pre-treatment group differences. In comparing the pre-treat­
ment data across the three conditions, i t was found that no sinnificant 
differences existed with regard to the mean age, past dental experience, 
or pulse rate of the patients. Pulse rate did not correspond signifi­
cantly with typical or present arousal level of the patient (r_ = .19, 
£= .15, and r_ = -.04, p_ = .79, respectively), or with the observational 
reports of the dentist and assistant (r. = .07, £ = .62, and r. = -15, 
£ = .26, respectively). 
Typical arousal level did show an overall significant effect in 
this office, £ (2,57) = 3.27, p = .045, and a subseguent Scheffe's test 
indicated that the difference existed between the Drug-informed and 
Normality group. The mean of the former group v/as significantly higher 
than that of the latter (6.00 vs. 4.05, £<.05). The use of analysis 
of covariance in appropriate subsequent analyses adjusted for this ini­
tial discrepancy. 
Length of treatment. Analyses shov/ed no significant differ­
ences among the group means as to total time spent in the dental ehair 
or total time in actual treatment. 
Attributions of arousal. Subjects in this office demonstrated 
significant differences across conditions in their attributions of 
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arousal to both the druq injection and to fear. The overall effect 
obtained for attributions to the drug, £ (2,57) = 14.196, p_ = .0001, 
was further examined through a Scheffe's test. The results revealed 
that the Drug-informed condition differed from the Normality group 
(g_<.05) and from the Control (p_<.05). The Normality and Control 
groups did not differ. 
Analysis of covariance was employed to assess the effects of 
condition on attributions to fear. Given the original discrepancy 
between groups as to typical arousal level and the high correlation 
between typical arousal and fear (r. = .27, £= .035), i t was necessary 
to covary out the effects of the typical arousal variable. The results 
indicated that an overall effect was present, F_ (2,56) = 5.67, £ = .006. 
A subsequent Newman-Keuls routine assessed the differences between 
specific groups and found the discrepancy, as predicted, to exist 
between the Drug-informed condition and the Control group. The mean 
of the former condition was significantly lower than the latter 
(p_<.05). AS indicated on Table 5, the Normality group mean was not 
significantly different from the others, but did fall in the predicted 
di recti on. 
This apparent inverse relationship between attributions to 
fear and attributions to the drug, which is suggested by the direction 
of mean differences across the conditions, was also indicated by the 
correlation between these two dependent measures (_r = -.26, p_ = .049) 
over the entire group of subjects. The interdependence of attributions 
was also found within the Druq-informed group itself, although here it 
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did not reach significance levels (r_ = -.27, £ = .26). 
A further examination of the data, taking sex of the subject 
into consideration, revealed the same significant effect of condition on 
subjects' attributions to both fear and to the drug. It also uncovered 
a significant sex effect along with a marginally significant interaction 
between sex and condition with regard to fear attributions, £ (1,53) = 
8.48, £= .005, and £ (2,53) = 2.45, £= .096, respectively. Overall, 
females reported fear as a greater cause of their arousal than did the 
males, and this difference was significant within both Drug-informed 
and Control conditions, £(1,17) = 4.88, £= .04, and £(1,17) = 8.59, 
£= .009, respectively. The mean female and male attributions to fear 
did not differ within the Normality condition. 
Arousal level. An analysis of covariance which adjusted for 
the typical levels of arousal reported by the patients revealed a sig­
nificant overall effect among conditions for present arousal level, 
£ (2,56) = 3.63, £= .033. A Newman-Keuls routine performed on the 
adjusted means determined that the Control group reported significantly 
more arousal than either the Drug-informed or Normality groups (£<.05, 
in both cases). The Drug-informed and Normality conditions did not 
differ significantly. 
A further analysis of the data which examined for sex effects 
found no difference for the sexes with regard to typical arousal level, 
but slightly higher levels of present arousal reported by females over­
all, although not significantly so, £ (2,56) = 2.09, £= .15. A mar­
ginally significant difference did emerge within the Drug-informed 
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condition, where females reported higher levels of present arousal 
than males, £ (1,17) = 4.30, £ = .054. 
Analysis of covariance, with typical level of arousal as the 
covariate, revealed no significant difference between any of the groups 
with regard to the observational reports provided by the dentist and 
dental assistant. Interrater reliability between these two data sources 
was significant at the .001 level (r_ = .51) and these reports both also 
corresponded significantly with the arousal reports of the patients 
(I = -23> JL = -028 and r = .51, £ = .001). 
Additional measures. Subjects' perceptions of normality, self-
focus, and reassurance did not differ across conditions, as indicated by 
a series of one-way analysis of variance. 
Within-condi tion analyses . A significant predictor of attri­
butions to the drug, based on a regression analysis, was the age of the 
patient, £ (2,57) = 4.62, £<.05, which accounted for 20% of the 
variance. A positive relationship existed between the ane of the 
patient and his/her attributions of arousal to the drug (beta = .45, 
£= .045). Increased age corresponded with increased attributions to 
the drug. 
Meta-analysis of the Dependent Measures 
The differences which emerged between the offices with regard 
to age of the patients, actual treatment performed, time in treatment, 
and arousal levels reported by the patients, precluded the possibility 
of combining the data for an overall analysis. These differences were 
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especially pronounced for Office 1, in comparison to Offices 2 and 3, 
as will be further covered in the Discussion section of this paper. 
An alternative way of examining the pattern of results was 
suggested by Cooper (1979), using Stouffer's unweighted method of meta­
analysis. Stouffer's method provides us with a way of combining the 
results of independent tests of the same hypothesis, to produce an 
overall probability level related to the observed pattern of results. 
A meta-analysis performed across the three offices for the com­
parison between the levels of attributions to fear in the Drug-informed 
groups indicated that the probability of this pattern of results occur-
ing by chance within three studies is .0202 (z_ = 2.05). Similarly, an 
analysis performed on the comparison of Normality and Control groups 
revealed a probability level of .39 (z_ = .28). With regard to the level 
of arousal reported by the patients, a meta-analysis across offices 
comparing Drug-informed and Control groups indicated a probability level 
of .33 (_z = .45). The probability of the pattern of the Normality and 
Control group comparisons was established at .047 (z_- 1.67), for the 
pattern across the three offices. 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
Attributions of Arousal to the Drug Injection 
In all three of the offices, patients in the Drug-informed con­
ditions attributed significantly more of their arousal to the drug 
injection, as predicted, than did subjects in either the Normality or 
Control groups. In these latter two conditions, subjects perceived the 
drug as having virtually no effect on their arousal. The responses of 
the Drug-informed group could, at the very least, simply be considered 
as an indirect confirmation that the information given to patients 
regarding the drug was received, remembered, and believed. The manip­
ulation check provided on the post-treatment questionnaire in this study 
more directly ascertained this fact, as was its purpose, and i t is 
believed that the measurements obtained of significant attributions of 
arousal to the drug in the Drug-informed condition represent more than 
just a second manipulation check. This response suggests also that 
actual reattribution of the source of arousal did occur for the indi­
viduals in the Drug-informed condition; more specifically, they reattri­
buted at least a part of their arousal to the drug, as the experimental 
hypothesis predicted. 
Reattribution of the source of arousal has generally been 
assumed to be the operating mechanism which has produced changes in 
behaviors or levels of anxiety in subjects in much of the past research 
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in this area of study. However, such studies as Cantor, Zillmann, and 
Bryant (1975), Loftis and Ross (1974a, 1974b), and Ross, Rodin, and 
Zimbardo (1969) have noted the absence of predicted changes in self-
reported causal attributions, despite the other effects produced. Such 
indications that subjects can change their behavior or level of anxiety 
without a parallel change in their causal attributions violates the very 
basic expectation of the theory, i.e., that reattribution of causation is 
responsible for the experimental effects with behavior or attitude which 
are achieved. The data of such studies, without the reattribution mech­
anism directly demonstrated, are more open to alternate interpretations. 
Indeed, the research and conclusions of Calvert-Boyanowsky and Leventhal 
(1975) have suggested the alternative view that the reduced anxiety 
effects of reattribution studies are produced not at all by subjects who 
are actively reattributing the cause of their arousal, but rather as a 
result of the reassurance provided to the subjects by the experimental 
information offered which confirms their perceived reality. 
The drug attribution data of this study, then, more than just 
offering a check on the manipulation, also indicates that contrary to 
the research mentioned above, reattribution was l ikely the operatinq 
mechanism in this study within the Drug-informed condition. Subjects 
did reattribute the cause of their arousal at least partially to the 
drug. This conclusion is supported by the fact that some individuals 
who did receive and remember the information provided to them in the 
Drug-informed condition (as evidenced by the direct check on the manip­
ulation) nevertheless stil l did not endorse the drug injection as a 
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source of their arousal. As might be expected, individual differences do 
apparently exist amonq subjects in their responses to the experimental 
manipulation. An individual may receive the information and remember i t, 
but not necessarily subsequently reattribute causation. It is important 
to note then, that while the check on the manipulation just confirms the 
reception of the experimental information, the actual endorsement of the 
drug injection as a source of arousal serves a dual function, both as a 
manipulation check and as a confirmation that reattribution has occurred. 
Reports by subjects of their levels of self-monitering, norm­
ality, and reassurance fail to support the conclusions of Calvert-
Boyanowsky and Leventhal. In each of the offices, levels of these three 
variables showed no significant differences across the conditions (with 
the marginally-significant exception of reassurance reports in Office 2) 
thereby indicating that differential feelings of normality and reassur­
ance were probably not responsible for the experimental effects 
obtained. 
Given that individual differences exist with regard to sen­
sitivity and/or susceptability to a reattribution manipulation, a par­
ticular individual's response may then be possibly affected by a number 
of factors to varying degrees. Past research has suggested some of 
these variables. For example, Schachter's cognitive theory of emotions 
(1964) proposed that to the extent that an individual feels a need to 
explain an ambiguous physiological state of arousal, he would turn to 
external cues as a source of information. In other words, i f the arou­
sal is unusual or lacking a specific perceived cause, the individual 
with attention focused on this arousal may be more apt to accept 
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externally-supplied information to interpret this state. Furthermore, 
a person who is less familiar with any particular arousing situation 
would be more l ikely to accept reattribution information at that parti­
cular time than he would in more familiar encounters. 
An additional hypothesis regarding individual differences 
involves the arousal level of the subject. The work of Conger, Conqer, 
and Brehm (1972) and Nisbett and Schachter (1966) suggested that low 
arousal subjects are most responsive to reattribution cues, and in fact, 
high levels of arousal preclude reattribution. On the other hand, 
Loftis and Ross (1974a, 1974b) and Beaman, Diener, Tefft, and Fraser 
(1972) have demonstrated through their research, and Zuckerman has 
suggested on the basis of his post-hoc analysis of data (1974), 
that highly aroused subjects can respond to the reattribution manipu­
lation and in fact sometimes respond more so than do less aroused per­
sons . 
The work of Valins (1966) and Barefoot and Straub (1971) has 
suggested that not only are individual variables important, but that 
situational factors may also affect the occurrence of reattribution. 
Following a reattribution stimulus, i t anpears that a subject must have 
both the appropriate length of time and the subsequent validating exper­
ience to cognitively grasp and hold that reattribution information in 
mind, and to make an actual reattribution of causation. 
A secondary purpose of this study was to uncover the person­
ality or situational factors which produce individual differential 
reattribution effects. Therefore, the variables of age, sex, arousal 
and symptom levels, treatment time, and self-focus, such as are sug­
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gested by the literature, were examined in regression analyses to 
assess their predictive value for reattributions to the drug. The 
analysis of Office 2 data did reveal that a significant predictor of 
attributions to the drug was the present arousal level of the patient. 
A strong positive relationship existed between this level of arousal and 
the patients' attributions to the drug. This positive relationship was 
also found in Office 1, although it was not significant (r_ = .35, n = 
.12). In Office 3, arousal level did not reach significance as a pre­
dictor of attributions to the drug, and in fact a weak negative rela­
tionship existed between the two variables. The strong predictor of 
attributions to the drug in this office was age of the patient, which 
corresponded positively with drug attributions. 
These inconsistencies between offices in the results of the 
regression analyses prohibit the clear definition of specific factors 
which may predispose or enhance an individual 's response to the reattri­
bution manipulation. It appears that no one factor consistently oper­
ated in a predictive capacity for all of the three offices. It is 
interesting to note, however, that neither increased age or high arousal 
level precluded the occurrence of the reattribution process, thus sup­
porting the conclusions of Loftis and Ross (1974) and Beaman, et al. 
(1972) with regard to high arousal levels. Particularly in the Drug-
informed condition of Office 2, the mean arousal level reported was 
higher than the other offices, as were also both the attributions to 
fear and to the drug. As noted in the results section, arousal level 
accounted for 77% of the variance within this condition of this office. 
The data may in fact be interpreted as indicating that arousal must be 
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felt before a reattribution of the source of that arousal can definitely 
be made to any causal factor. The relationship between arousal and 
attributions to fear does strongly support this notion in all three of 
the offices, where the correlation reached a .001 level in all cases. 
Attributions of Arousal to Fear 
Significantly fewer attributions to fear, compared to the 
Control group, were reported as predicted in the Drug-informed condition 
of Office 3. Subjects in this condition perceived fear as significantly 
less a cause of their arousal than did the Control group, and subjects 
at the same time had higher attributions of cause for arousal to the 
drug, above that of either the Control or Normality groups, therein 
suggesting the interdependence of reattributional effects. 
This effect did not reach significance in Offices 1 and 2, but 
the means of the Drug-in formed and Control groups in these two offices 
were consistently in the predicted direction. The meta-analysis 
performed on this comparison in the three offices indicated that the 
probability of such a pattern of results occurring by chance alone is 
less than two per cent. This offers support for the central hypothesis 
of this study, that a reattribution of arousal to the drug injection 
will produce a subsequent lessening of attributions to fear. 
Of the two offices which did not achieve significant results, 
Office 1 displayed the least substantial difference in mean scores 
between the Drug-informed and Control groups on the variable of 
attributions to fear. Additional data make i t possible to speculate 
why a stronger effect was not found. First of all, the dental proce­
66 
dures performed in Office 1 were routine operative dentistry, in con­
trast to the oral surgery performed in Offices 2 and 3. Although the 
overall mean typical arousal level of the patients in Office 1 was quite 
in line with that of the patients in the other offices (see Table 1), 
the subsequent mean arousal for the current visit reported in this par­
ticular dental office showed a drop both from the typical level of 
arousal of patients within this office and from the present arousal 
level which was felt by the patients in the other two offices. 
Also, the arousal level reported by the patients in Office 1 
showed the lowest overall mean and the least variability of the offices 
(see Table 6). The existence of relatively low arousal levels in Office 
1 was also confirmed by the low levels of patient arousal behavior 
which were reported by the dentist and dental assistant. 
Given the low level and lack of variability in the arousal 
reports of subjects in Office 1, along with the intuitive notion that 
the situation itself was not as arousing as that in Offices 2 and 3, 
i t seems reasonable to conclude that less of an experimental effect 
would occur in such a situation. 
It appears then, that a subject needs to feel aroused before 
he/she can attribute that arousal to a source. Furthermore, i t is also 
feasible that subjects in Office 1, even when they did feel aroused, 
were facing such a familiar routine that they made l ittle use of 
the new cognitive information provided to them by the experimenter. In 
Schachter's terms (1964), the arousal felt by subjects was not partic­
ularly ambiguous or unusual for these persons, and they did not feel a 
need to respond to the external cues given them in order to interpret 
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and explain their internal feeling. 
Another perspective from which to view these data is in terms of 
Valins' self-persuasion hypothesis (1966). The interpretation can be 
made that the information provided to the Druq-informed patients of 
Office 1 (that arousal would occur) was not subsequently verified by 
their own experience and therefore was disreqarded. 
It can then be argued that the Drug-informed patients in 
Offices 2 and 3, because they were facing a less familiar situation 
and/or because they did experience arousal which verified the informa­
tion which had been given to them, were more apt cognitively to accept 
an explanation for their arousal. 
Office 2 also did not achieve significant results in attribu­
tions to fear, although the means of the Drug-informed and Control 
groups were in the predicted direction. The weaker effect demonstrated 
in this office can most appropriately be attributed to the small number 
of subjects included per condition. A difficulty with small sample size 
is that inclusion of just one or two extreme scores can produce large 
effects on overall mean scores for the group. The l ikely presence of 
this problem is demonstrated by the irregularities which emeraed in the 
analyses of sex differences within Office 2. More specifically, the 
males of the Control group (n = 5) reported higher levels of typical 
arousal and attributions to fear, and lower levels of reassurance than 
did the females. This represents a reversal of the trends which 
occurred in the other conditions within this office. 
The attributions to fear of these Control males within Office 2 
were particularly in contrast to the data obtained in Office 3, where a 
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significant sex effect existed both overall for the conditions and 
v/ithin the Drug-informed and Control grouos. Females consistently 
reported attributions to fear at hinher mean levels than did the males. 
It does not appear, on the basis of a male-female comparison of attri­
butions to the drug, that one sex was differentially affected by the 
experimental manipulation compared to the other. Therefore, i t can be 
suggested that females in general were more open than men in expressing 
their perceived fear to the female experimenter. This hypothesis is 
not reinforced by the data of the Office 2 Control group, of course. 
However, i t is suggested that had more data been gathered in that 
particular office, a trend in line with the other conditions may have 
developed. 
An additional concern of this study involved the attributions of 
arousal to fear which would occur for subjects given information about 
the normality of their experience. The Normality condition was included 
in this study to tap this factor and also to serve as a comparison for 
the Drug-informed condition. The results indicate that the Drug-
informed condition did produce the stronger effect, as evidenced by the 
lower level of fear which was perceived by subjects as causal in their 
arousal. The Normality condition did show a trend in the predicted 
direction in two of the three offices, however the meta-analysis of 
these comparisons did not produce a significant result (p_ = .39). 
The trend in these means of the Normality group with regard to 
attributions to fear in comparison to the Control subjects indicates 
that some response to the information supplied in the Normality condi­
tion did occur. In line with the conceptualization of a reattribution 
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of normality as formulated bv Svanum and Beaman (1974), this can be 
interpreted as an occurrence due to the fact that when an individual 
is informed of the normality of his feelings, he may subsequently per­
ceive the causal level of his fear as being less extreme in comparison 
to what he originally had thought. This would not change his perception 
of what is normal for him in the situation, but rather would readjust 
his thinking in terms of how he stands in relationship to other peoDle, 
and would therefore tend to lead to moderation in his comparative judg­
ment of the part which fear played in his arousal. This reasonino 
would explain why the normality self-reoorts of subjects were not dif­
ferent for the Normality condition, but the fear attributions did show 
a tendency to decrease. As stated previously however, this effect on 
attributions to fear within the Normality group was not significant. 
Arousal Levels of the Subjects 
The research of Beaman, et al. (1972), Dienstbier and Munter 
(1971), Ross, Rodin, and Zimbardo (1969), and Storms and Nisbett (1970) 
have demonstrated reduced arousal levels as a result of the experi­
mental reattribution manipulation. In the present study however, the 
reattribution manipulation did not promote such a definite effect in 
reducing reported arousal. In Office 3, a siqnificantly lower level of 
arousal was reported in the Drun-informed condition as compared to the 
Control group. On the basis of these data alone, i t might be suggested 
that subjects who reattributed their arousal also reduced their per­
ceived level of arousal. However, Office 2 reported the reverse effect 
(a 1 though not statistically significant) for the Drug-informed condition 
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and a meta-analysis of the Drug-informed and Control comparisons across 
the three offices indicated that the probability of this trend occurrinn 
by chance does not fall within acceptable l imits. It appears reasonable 
on this basis to conclude that individuals' perceptions of arousal level 
do not necessarily change even though they have reattributed the cause 
of that arousal to a neutral source. 
The Normality condition of this study strongly supported the 
previous work of Svanum and Beaman (1974). This condition in all three 
offices showed a lower level of arousal compared to the Control group, 
and this difference was significant for Office 3. A meta-analysis per­
formed on these group comparisons indicated that the probability of this 
pattern of results occurring by chance is .047. It is reasonable to 
conclude that, just as the normality information may have succeeded in 
readjusting the perceived causal level of fear, i t also produced either 
an adjustment in subjects' perceptions of the level of arousal felt or 
i t resulted in cognitions which actually reduced the arousal level 
itself. In fact, the Normality condition subjects reported arousal 
below the levels of either the Drug-informed or Control groups in all 
three offices. 
The behavioral reports of patient arousal which were provided 
by the dentists and dental assistants did not reveal any differences 
between conditions for any of the three offices. However, i t is diffi­
cult to place confidence in the validity of these reports. Raters were 
not pre-trained, and it was apparent from the verbal comments made 
during the study that raters often based their reports of patient 
arousal level on aspects of behavior which were differently emphasized 
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from rater to rater, and particularly between dentist and assistant. 
This discrepancy was suggested also by the interrater correlations 
obtained in Offices 1 and 3. Even though these correlations reached 
statistical significance, they are unacceptably low. 
There appear to be two separate mechanisms in operation in this 
study, represented by the two separate experimental conditions. The 
Drug-informed subjects actually reattributed the cause of their arousal, 
placing less emphasis on fear and more on the drug injection as a cause 
of their arousal. This experimental manipulation was most effective in 
reducing the perceived causal level of fear, while only minimally 
effective in reducing reported arousal level. 
On the other hand, in the Normality condition the effects 
obtained v/ere in contrast to those found in the Drug-informed condition. 
The attributions to fear of the Normality group patients were only 
slightly lower that those of the Control group, while a more dramatic 
effect occurred with regard to arousal, as evidenced by the lower 
arousal reported by these patients compared to either the Drug-informed 
or Control groups. It is thought that these effects resulted from a 
reattribution to normality. Normality in this case is not conceptu­
alized as a specific causal entity, as was the drug injection, but 
rather represented a new guideline to which the subjects could compare 
their feelings about the dental experience. 
The responses of the subjects in the Normality condition suggest 
that a reattribution of arousal to another specifically listed source 
v/as not in operation in this group. However, the structure of the 
experimental questionnaire was such that i t placed restrictions on the 
particular entities which subjects could endorse as being causes of their 
arousal. Therefore, i t is possible that while the Normality group did 
not appear to reattribute the cause of their arousal as judged by their 
responses on this questionnaire, a reattribution to a causal factor not 
l isted on the questionnaire or to a diffusion of such agents feasibly 
may have occurred. The present study is unable to assess this alter­
nate possibility. 
Conclusions 
The present study has successfully demonstrated its predicted 
hypotheses. The mechanism of reattribution of arousal to the drun 
injection was shown to be in operation in the Drug-informed conditions 
of all three of the offices, and a lower level of causal attributions to 
fear was demonstrated as a positive result of this reattribution over­
all in the study and particularly within the third office. Furthermore, 
the manipulation employed in the Drug-informed condition v/as thought to 
be effective due to its reattribution properties, rather than simply 
because of any extraneous reassurance effects. 
Unfortunately, due to the inconsistencies in the results of the 
regression analyses from the three separate offices, this study could 
not offer definitive evidence regarding the personality variables which 
differentially affect an individual's response to a reattribution manip­
ulation. The data did suggest however, that high arousal levels are not 
a barrier to the achievement of reattribution effects in this situation. 
The study also suggested that situational variables, such as subject 
familiarity with the situation or a lack of felt arousal, may reduce the 
possibilities of reattribution occurring. The maintenance of reattri-
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bution effects also failed to be effectively demonstrated in this study; 
however, this was to be partially attributed to the lack of initial 
effects which occurred with the particular subjects who returned for the 
follow-up visit. 
Although the manipulation of reattribution was found to be 
effective in reducing the level of fear which was perceived as causal 
for arousal, i t was not particularly effective in reducing perceived 
levels of arousal. Subjects did reattribute their physiological arousal 
to a less emotionally loaded source (epinephrine instead of fear), yet 
such a cognition did not produce a decrease in arousal levels. Based on 
earlier research it had been expected that being able to recognize a 
nonemotional source for arousal might produce a cognitively mediated 
lowering of that arousal. 
The present study demonstrated the positive effects of providing 
subjects with information regarding the normality of their experience in 
the dental office. This information was found to result in lower per­
ceived arousal levels, although whether actual physiological effects 
were obtained was not assessed in the present study. One might consider 
investigating this issue in future research. 
The data of the present study suggest positive implications for 
their application in the normal routine of the dental office. Both of 
the experimental manipulations (drug and normality information) produced 
positive changes compared to normal office routine (Control groun). 
The reattribution to the drug produced lower attributions to fear, 
while the normality reattribution was successful in producinn a lower 
level of perceived arousal. It can be suggested that either of these 
effects may serve to also reduce the negative emotionality which is 
typically experienced in the dental office, although whether such a 
beneficial decrease in neoative emotionality actually occurred was not 
directly tested in this study. It is also not clear at this point 
whether one of the two experimental effects obtained is more desirable 
than the other nor whether they produce a differential effect with 
regard to actual physiological arousal. It is important to note that 
the reattribution manipulation in the Drug-informed condition and the 
mention of symptoms in the normality and Drug-informed groups did not 
produce a negative effect through suggestion as might have been anti­
cipated. Subjects in these grouDS did not aopear to be sensitized to 
arousal by the provided information. These groups did not focus on 
their arousal any more than did the Control group nor did they exper­
ience heightened arousal or symptom levels. 
If it can be assumed that the effects shown in the present study 
are indicative of the more definite beneficial changes mentioned above, 
a combination of the drug and normality information, which would inform 
patients of the particular symptoms which are common to dental patients, 
of the normality of such symptoms, and of the causal factors involved in 
arousal, would appear to be an effective innovation in the dental 
situation. However, further research is needed to definitely assess 
this possibility. 
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY 
The present study attempted to demonstrate the operation of 
reattribution principles in the naturalistic settinq of a dental office. 
It was initially assumed that patients in the dental situation label 
their physiological arousal as "fear", while not recognizing the physio­
logical arousal effects which are produced by another causal factor, 
the local anesthetic administered during treatment. 
Patients of three local offices were included in the study as 
they underwent their scheduled treatments. As the independent exper­
imental manipulation, one group of subjects was verbally informed of 
those physiological side-effects caused by the administration of the 
local anesthetic, while a control group received no such information, 
and as such represented the normal office routine. A third group of 
patients was informed of the normality of the symptoms typically felt 
by dental patients. This latter group was included as an additional 
comparison to tease out and assess the effects of a reattribution to 
"normal i  ty •." 
The comparative effects of this information provided to subjects 
on their subsequent causal attributions for arousal and their perceived 
levels of arousal were assessed through self-reports as the main depen­
dent variables. The experimental hypotheses predicted that subjects in 
the Drug-informed group would reattribute the source of their arousal 
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at least in part to the drug, thus reducing their perceptions of fear as 
a causal factor in arousal, and quite possible subsequently reducing 
their perceptions of arousal itself also. Subjects in the Normality 
condition were not expected to reattribute their arousal to another 
source, per se, but were predicted to reduce their perceptions of fear 
and arousal levels due to the information provided to them which might 
readjust their idea of how other persons react to the dental situation. 
Results of the study largely supported the predictions. Com­
pared to the Normality and Control groups, subjects in the Druq-
informed conditions had significantly hinher attributions to the drug 
and as such demonstrated that reattribution was l ikely the mechanism in 
operation. Patients in Office 3 also reported significantly lower 
attributions to fear within the Drug-informed condition, to a level 
below that of the Control group, and this pattern of results was 
significant across all three of the offices. Drug-informed subjects 
did not however report lower arousal levels, although the means 
showed a trend in the predicted direction. 
Subjects in the Normality group were found to have significantly 
lower arousal levels within Office 3, and this pattern was found to be 
significant across the three offices. 
The results of this study are favorable with regard to impli­
cations for the dental situation. Both the drug-related and normality 
information showed beneficial effects above that of the control group 
which represented the normal office routine. The data also suooested 
that high arousal does not preclude these beneficial effects. Finally, 
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increased confidence may be placed in the applicability of the findinas 
to actual dental offices, since the study was performed in a naturalistic 
setting. 
APPENDIX A 
PRE-TREATMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
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TO OUR PATIENTS: 
In the hope of making each of our patient's visit to the dental 
office as comfortable as possible, we are gathering opinions from our 
current patients as to the efficiency of our office procedures. We have 
constructed this brief questionnaire with which to obtain your 
impressions and feelings about the dental experience. 
The questionnaire consists of this set of items, to be fi l led out 
now, and a second set, to be completed after your treatment. We would 
certainly appreciate your comments, as they will help us to locate areas 
in which changes may be beneficial. 
Your answers will remain totally confidential. You need not put 
your name on the form. Your responses will be tallied along with those 
of our other patients. Please answer as clearly, as honestly, and as 
completely as possible. 
This questionnaire is completely voluntary. If you do not wish 
to f i l l it out, we certainly respect your wishes. However, your help 
and comments would be sincerely appreciated. Thank you. 
1. Sex: Male Female Age: 
2. General Dental Experience: How many times have you, in the past, 
had dental work performed (not including simple check-ups and 
cleaning)? Just estimate: 
Less than 5 times; 5 to 10 times; 11 to 25; Over 25 
3. Have you been in for treatment with this particular dentist before? 
Yes No 
4. It is a common experience for many patients to feel some type of 
physical arousal (to be "worked-up", excited, have "jitters") while 
receiving dental treatment. Many other persons feel quite unaroused 
(unexcited). On the basis of your own previous dental experiences, 
how would you describe your typical level of arousal while in the 
dentist's chair (not including simple check-ups)? Please circle 
the number on the Tine below which most closely represents your 
answer: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
Not at Some- Moderately Quite Very much 
all what a bit aroused 
aroused 
APPENDIX B 
OBSERVATIONAL RATING SCALE 
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1 2 3 4 
No arousal 
Normal 
conversation; 
Calm, relaxed 
appearance; 
Small 
Amount 
Talks a lot; 
Talks faster; 
Asks questions; 
Alert, watchful; 
No agitation; Minimal 
fidgeting; 
No visible sympathetic 
symptoms; 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
Moderate 
Verbal statements 
of anxiety; 
"Frinhtened" look; 
(as may be noticed 
i  n eyes); 
Fi dqeting; 
Gripping arms of 
chair at times; 
Beginning to perspire; 
(as may be noticed by 
a damp handshake); 
Quite Very much 
a bit Arousal 
Verbal fear; Crying; 
Flushed; 
Color chanoe 
Tears; 
Big eyes; 
Small pupils; 
"Ready to 
leave" 
Active in chair; 
Flinching; 
Quite .iumoy; 
"Death grip"; 
White knuckles 
Extremely 
anitated; 
Sweat on forehead; 
Flushed; 
Excessive 
perspiration; 
Pale, faint; 
CO 
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We would appreciate if .you would answer just a few short ques­
tions regarding your dental treatment today. Your answers will be 
totally confidential. There is no need for you to put your name on this 
form. Please answer as honestly and completely as you can. Thank you. 
1. On the basis of your own dental experience today how would you 
describe your level of arousal (how "worked-up you felt) in the 
dental chair? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8_ 9 10_ 
Not at all Some- Moderately Quite Very much 
aroused what a bit aroused 
2. Did you feel any of the following symptoms during your dental 
treatment today? Circle the number on each l ine which represents 
how strongly you felt each of these today: 
A. "Jitters": 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all Some- Moderately Quite Very much 
what a bit 
B. Sweaty palms and/or perspiration: 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
C. "Butterflies" in the stomach: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
D. Tightness in the chest or elsewhere: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
E. Increased breathing and/or heart-rate: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
F. Light-headed or dizzy: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
(Please  go on to  the  next  page. )  
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3. Listed below are some of the factors in the dental situation which 
can produce arousal symptoms such as those mentioned on the previous 
page. Please mark each of the items below according to how much you 
feel that i t contributed to your overall level of arousal (whatever 
symptoms you felt) today in this office . If you feel that a 
particular factor was not at all a cause of your symptoms or if the 
factor actually helped to reduce your arousal, just mark i t as a 
"1" by circling that number on the line. Otherwise, circle the 
number along the line which represents how strongly the factor 
contributed to your arousal. 
A. The physical surroundings of the office (cleanliness, furniture, 
etc.): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
No effect Moderate 
(or effect on 
reduced arousal 
arousal) 
Very much 
a cause of 
arousal 
symptoms 
B. The manner or personality of the dentist: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
C. The manner or personality of the dental ass is tant(s): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
D. The noise level of the office: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
E. The visual presence of dental instruments: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
F. Fear of discomfort and/or fear of the dental procedure itself: 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
G. The actual physical effects of drugs administered durino 
treatment : 
1 2 3  4  5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
(Please  go on to  the  next  page. )  
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How normal do you think it is for a patient to feel the way that you, 
yourself, did today during your dental treatment? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  T0_ 
Not at Some- Moderately Quite Very much 
all what a bit 
normal 
Did you pay much attention during your treatment today, to how your 
body was responding to the situation (that is, were you aware of the 
feelings and sensation in your mouth or body)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9  1 0  
Not at Some- Moderately Quite Very much 
all what a bit aware 
aware 
Did you receive information from the staff regarding the effects that 
the injection of xylocaine (novocaine) would have on your system? 
Yes No Can't remember 
If yes, please briefly state what you can remember of what you were 
told, in the following space ( a few words are plenty ): 
If you did receive information about the injection, how reassuring 
was this information to you, if at all? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
Not at Some- Moderately Quite Very much 
all what a bit 
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Table  1  
Group Means of Typical Arousal Level 
Drug-informed No rma1i ty Control Combined 
Office 1 
Male M 5.77 5.70 4.23 5.07 
SD 2.45 2.75 2.25 2.64 
Female M 3.83 4.90 4.47 4.57 
SD 2.79 2.03 2.59 2.24 
Overall M 4.80 5.30 4.35 
SD 2.61 2.39 2.37 
Office 2 
Male M 4.80 2.80 5.60 4.47 
SD 3.89 1.48 3.58 3.11 
Female M 5.20 6.80 2.60 4.87 
SD. 2.95 3.40 1.67 3.14 
Overall M 5.10 4.80 4.10 
SD 3.14 3.26 3.07 
Office 3 
Male M 6.40 4.00 4.80 5.06 
SD_ 2.95 1.89 2.39 2.57 
Female M 5.60 4.10 5.30 5.00 
SD_ 2.37 2.13 2.87 2.45 
Overall M 6.00 4.05 5.05 
SD 2.64 1.96 2.26 
Table  2  
Group Means of Pre-treatment Data 
Drun-informed Normal i  t.y Control 
Age 
Office 1 26.55 23.00 23.75 
2 39.70 40.10 44.90 
3 39.50 43.80 43.05 
Past Dental Experience 
1 2.60 2.70 2.70 
2 3.00 2.60 3.40 
3 2.80 3.05 2.60 
Pulse 
1_ 70.00 70.85 71.95 
2 77.20 71.60 76.00 
3 80.00 74.20 71.60 
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Table 3 
Group Means: 
Observational Ratings, Symptom Level, Length of Treatment 
Drug-in formed Normality Control 
Rating by Dentist 
Office 1 2.25 2.75 2.35 
2 4.50 3.10 3.10 
3 4.35 4.05 4.10 
Rating by Assistant 
1 2.55 2.45 2.95 
2 4.30 2.50 3.20 
3 3.65 3.40 4.25 
Symptom Level 
1_ 14.00 17.00 13.35 
2 15.60 13.10 13.40 
3 15.80 13.20 18.90 
Total Treatment Time 
1 35.25 36.00 35.50 
2 18.50 11.00 13.50 
3^ 13.00 12.50 15.50 
Total Chair Time 
1_ 57.00 56.75 53.50 
2_ 45.00 34.50 41.00 
3 37.75 33.50 35.00 
Office 1 
Male M 
SD 
Female M 
SD 
Overall M 
SD 
Offi ce 2 
Hale M 
SD_ 
Female M 
SD 
Overall M 
SD 
Offi ce 3 
Male M 
SD 
Female M 
SD 
Overall M 
SD 
Table 4 
Group Means 
Attributions of Arousal to Drug 
Drug-informed Normali ty Control Combi ned 
2.60 1.40 1.00 1.67 
2.07 1.27 .00 1.52 
3.20 1.20 1.20 1.87 
2.30 .42 .42 1.63 
2.90 1.30 1.10 
2.15 .92 .31 
4.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
3.16 .00 .00 2.23 
4.40 1.00 1.00 2.14 
2.79 .00 .00 2.23 
4.20 1.00 1.00 
2.82 .00 .00 
2.80 1.10 1.20 1.70 
1.62 .32 .63 1.26 
3.50 1.00 1.00 1.84 
3.06 .00 .00 2.09 
3.15 1.05 1.10 
2.41 .22 .45 
Table 5 
Group Means 
Attributions of Arousal to Fear 
Drug-informed Normal i  t.y Control Combi ned 
Offi ce 1 
Male M 3.60 5.,20 2.90 3.90 
SD_ 3.99 3.36 2.00 2.93 
Female M 2.70 4.20 4.00 • 3.63 
SID 2.45 2.90 2.75 2.69 
Overall M 3.15 4.70 3.45 
SD 2.70 3.10 2.44 
Office 2 
r i a l  e M 2.60 3.00 7.00 4.20 
SD_ 1.02 2.83 3.74 3.38 
Female [1 4.80 5.60 2.00 4.13 
SD 4.08 3.65 1.23 3.40 
Overall M 3.44 4.22 4.85 
SD 3.20 3.37 3.72 
Offi ce 3 
Male M 2.12 3.74 3.75 3.23 
SCf 1.57 2.79 3.02 2.54 
Female M 3.98 3.96 7.95 5.27 
SID 2.62 3.80 3.27 3.71 
Overall M 2.62 * 4.29 * 5.84 * 
SD 2.24 3.25 3.77 
* Adjusted means 
Table 6 
Group Means 
Arousal Level: Self-report at Present Visit 
Drug-informed Normali ty Control Combined 
Offi ce 1 
Mai e 
SD 
Female M 
SD 
Overall M 
SD 
4.20 
2.07 
2.30 
1.85 
3.68  *  
1.94 
4.60 
2.72 
3.00 
2.00  
3.52 * 
2.46 
3.89 
2.13 
4.61 
1.96 
4.10 * 
2.44 
4.23 
2 . 2 8  
3.31 
2.03 
Office 2 
Male M 
SD 
Female M 
SD 
Overall M 
SD 
4.80 
3.11 
5.60 
3.58 
5.20 
3.19 
2 . 6 0  
2.07 
5.40 
3.65 
4.00 
3.16 
6 .00  
3.39 
2.40 
1.67 
4.20 
O 
4.47 
3.07 
4.47 
3.25 
^ .16 
Offi ce 3 
Ma 1 e M 
SD 
Female M 
SD 
Overall M 
SD 
3.69 
2.85 
5.91 
2.58 
4.27 * 
2 . 8 0  
3.44 
1.65 
3.56 
2.99 
4.04 * 
2.35 
5.42 
1.95 
6.18 
3.06 
5.79 * 
2.55 
4.18 
2 . 2 8  
5.22 
2.85 
* Adjusted Means 
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Office 1 
Table  7  
Group fleans of Perceived Normality 
Drun-i nformed Normali ty Control Combined 
Male M 5.80 6.10 6.40 6.10 
SD 2.62 2.64 2.84 2.41 
Female M 5.30 6.40 7.20 6.30 
S D  2.11 2.72 2.25 2.55 
Overall M 5.55 6.52 6.80 
SD 2.33 2.61 2.53 
Office 2 
Male M 6.20 5.20 5.80 5.73 
SD 3.83 2.95 3.11 3.26 
Female M 7.40 7.40 5.80 6.87 
SD_ 2.41 2.97 3.11 2.87 
Overall M 6.80 6.30 5.80 
SD 3.08 3.02 2.94 
Offi ce 3 
Male M 6.30 6.70 7.10 6.70 
SD 2.67 2.87 2.47 2.47 
Female M 7.70 5.90 8.80 7.46 
Sir 1.77 2.60 1.75 2.53 
Overall M 7.00 6.30 7.95 
SD 2.32 2.70 2.26 
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Office 1 
Table  8  
Group Means of Level of Self-Focus 
Drug-informed Normality Control Combined 
Male M 7.20 6.60 7.80 7.20 
SD 2.04 3.37 2.35 2.40 
Female M 7.50 6.60 7.60 7.24 
Sjl 2.12 2.76 1.58 2.05 
Overall M 7.35 6.60 7.70 
SD 2.03 3.00 1.95 
Office 2 
Male M 7.20 8.40 7.80 7.80 
S£ 3.83 1.14 2.86 3.12 
Female M 6.20 6.00 7.00 6.40 
SD 2.17 4.06 3.16 ' 3.72 
Overall M 6.70 7.20 7.40 
SD 2.98 3.08 2.88 
Office 3 
Male M 5.80 5.20 6.10 5.70 
SIT 2.90 2.39 2.77 2.79 
Female M 7.20 5.60 7.50 6.76 
S]I 2.90 3.00 2.51 2.79 
Overall M 6.50 5.40 6.80 
SD 2.91 2.64 2.67 
Table  9  
Group Means of Perceived Reassurance 
Druo-i n formed Normality Control Combined 
Offi ce 1 
Male M 5.50 6.40 5.10 5.67 
SD 2.38 2.63 .32 2.57 
Female M 6.90 5.80 5.50 6.07 
SD_ 2.23 2.62 2.76 2.15 
Overall M 6.20 6.10 5.30 
SD 2.61 2.57 1.92 
Office 2 
Male M 8.40 5.00 1.40 4.97 
SD_ 1.67 2.92 .89 3.49 
Female M 8.00 4.60 9.00 7.20 
SD 2.92 3.36 2.24 3.74 
Overall M 8.20 4.80 5.20 
SD 2.25 2.97 4.32 
Office 3 
Male M 5.50 4.00 6.80 5.44 
SD_ 2.55 2.63 2.39 2.45 
Female M 5.30 6.10 5.40 5.60 
S_D 3.13 2.38 2.41 2.52 
Overall M 5.40 5.05 6.10 
SD 2.78 2.67 2.45 
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Rav/ Data: Follow-up Measures 
Druq-i nformed 
Subject Pulse Arousal Symntoms Fear Druq 
1 
Visit 1 84. 0 i- • 13. 1. 1. 
Visit O 72 3 14 1 0 
2 
1 60 5 18 7 4 
2 76 4 13 2 4 
3 
1 72 6 16 Q 10 
2 83 O i. 8 7 1 
4 
1 64 2 8 1 1 
r 
2 60 2 7 4 1 
b 
1 72 6 18 4 2 
2 76 5 13 4 3 
Mean 1 70.4 4.2 14.6 4.4 3.6 
Mea n o 74.4 3.2 11.0 3.6 2.2 
Normality 
i  
1 80 3 20 9 1 
2 72 1 8 1 1 
2 
52 5 19 8 1 
60 8 29 10 1 
3 
60 9 42 8 1 
60 8 35 O O 1 
4 
60 6 20 5 1 
56 7 25 17 1 
1 63.0 5.75 25.25 7.5 1.0 
2 62.0 6.00 24.25 6.5 1.0 
Rav/ Data (Continued) 
Co ntrol 
Subject Pulse Arousal Synptons Fear Drug 
Visit 1 63. 1. 6. 2, 
Visit 2 68 2 6 1 
3 
4 
5 
1 80 5 14 1 
2 63 3 9 3 
1 38 6 12 6 
2 92 5 13 4 
1 83 7 32 7 
2 60 5 26 6 
1 70 6 31 9 
1 63 5 21 5 
Mean 1 77.8 5.0 19.0 5.0 
Mean 2 71.2 4.0 15.0 3.8 
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An initial concern existed in the planning stages of this study 
v/ith regard to possible extraneous variables which mirjht be in operation 
along with the experimental manipulation provided to the subjects, 
thereby affecting and confounding the results. The variables which were 
considered to be possible problems included the reassurance provided to 
subjects by the experimenter's presence or information (which would not 
be present in the control group), and the possible increased feeling of 
normality which might be induced by the experimenter in the experimental 
condition, through the discussion with the patient regarding typical 
symptoms of the dental experience. More specifically, the study needed 
to control these two variables to guarantee that data obtained in the 
Drug-informed group would not be a result of a differential level of 
normality or reassurance brought on by the experimenter or the infor­
mation provided, rather than the direct result of the content of the 
information provided to the subjects. 
An initial step was to bring the Normality condition into the 
paradigm. This condition, i t was hoped, would conceivably tease out the 
effects of normality and/or reassurance from the experimental effect 
predicted in the Drug-informed condition. A check on this assumption 
was done through a pilot study, using subjects in a role-playing 
si tuation. 
Twenty-two Introductory Psychology students were asked to 
imagine themselves in the dental chair about to have a f i l l ing done, 
having just received an injection of novocaine. Eight of these subjects 
v/ere then provided with the information for the Drug-informed grout) 
(written), seven were given the Normality group information, and the 
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remaining seven subjects were provided with no information (Control). 
They were then all asked to indicate on a 10-point scale, based on their 
role playing, how aroused they would feel in such a situation, how normal 
they would feel their reaction to be, and how reassured they would feel. 
Arousal levels of the Drug-informed, Normality, and Control 
groups did not differ significantly (M's = 5.50, 4.86, and 4.14, respec­
tively). The results suggested that both the Drug-informed and the 
Normality groups felt significantly more normal than the Control subjects 
and these two groups were not significantly different from each other 
(M's = 8.0, 8.14, 6.43, respectively). It was apparent from this data 
that the use of a Normality group as a comparison measure for the 
Drug-informed condition was an appropriate addition to the study. 
The Normality group reported significantly more reassurance than 
did either the Drug-informed or Control groups (M's = 6.17, 4.25, and 
2.14, respectively), and the Drug-informed group was significantly 
higher than the Control also. 
It was hoped that this pilot work could add insight into what 
exactly was being tapped in the three experimental conditions. The 
actual study data, however, found no significant differences on either 
of these two variables or on a third factor, level of self-focus, 
between any of the conditions (see Tables 7, 8, and 9). The lack of 
correspondence between the data from the role-playing situation and 
that from the actual study can probably be explained simply as a result 
of the artificiality of the role-playing exercise in this situation. 
Indeed, both dentists and assistants in the actual dental offices pro­
vided verbal reinforcement and reassurance to their patients, such that 
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even the control group received some support. Therefore, the experi­
menter did not apparently stand out as an exclusive source of reassur­
ance for the two experimental groups, nor did the Control group 
entirely lack contact with potentially reassuring sources. 
It should be noted that the level of reassurance felt in the 
Drug-informed condition of Office 2 was marginally significant (p =.057) 
compared to the Normality group, with the level of the former being the 
higher of the two. In this condition of Office 2, attributions to the 
drug, attributions to fear, and level of present arousal also stood out 
as the highest of the offices. A strong correlation was also noted 
between reassurance and attributions to the drug (r_ = .39, £ = .03). 
Therefore, i t appears that the high level of reassurance reported in 
this condition was an artifact due to the elevation of the other 
factors and the small number of subjects in the group. 
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